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Some philosophers think that facts about how we should think or act—the 
normative facts, as I will call them—do not depend wholly on the various attitudes or 
feelings we have about things. Call these philosophers realists. In my dissertation, I argue 
that the only viable form of realism is one on which normative facts are causally 
efficacious and fully depend on non-normative facts. Call this form of realism robust 
naturalism. 
Most arguments for robust naturalism assume a broader doctrine of metaphysical 
naturalism—roughly, the view that there are no non-natural or supernatural facts. My 
own arguments for robust naturalism do not assume this. I argue, first, that only robust 
naturalists can give a satisfactory reply to certain worries about the evolutionary 
influence on our normative beliefs; and second, that only robust naturalists can give a 
plausible account of how normative facts are grounded.  
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 Recently, philosophers have been especially concerned with the role that evolution 
has played in shaping our moral faculties. None deny that evolution has had some 
influence. But some argue that, if moral realism were true, such evolutionary influence 
would undermine our moral knowledge. I, and others, find such “evolutionary debunking 
arguments” (EDAs) to be deeply flawed, as they are normally formulated. In this paper, I 
formulate a new EDA, which targets moral knowledge indirectly, by providing a defeater 
for belief in categorical reasons. But if realism is true, then all positive moral beliefs entail 
the existence of at least one categorical reason. I argue from this that realism entails moral 
skepticism. One major virtue of this “New EDA” is that it does a much better job at 
avoiding the deepest problems with standard EDAs. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In §1, I formulate what I call the Standard 
EDA. This argument is meant to put in its most plausible form what is common to all (or 
at least most) of the EDAs on the market today. In §2, I summarize four popular objections 
to the Standard EDA. In §3, I defend the New EDA. Finally, in §4, I revisit the objections 
                                                 
1 Based on Justin Morton (2016) “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism” 
Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2: 233-253. 
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to the Standard EDA, showing how  two of them don’t threaten the New EDA, while with 
regard to the other two, the New EDA has distinct advantages over the Standard EDA. I 
conclude that there is a strong case to be made that, if moral realism is true, then we 
rationally ought to be moral skeptics. This is, at the very least, a high price for realists to 
pay.  
SECTION 1: THE STANDARD EDA  
 
Moral realism, as I define it, is the thesis that (i) sincere moral judgments express 
beliefs, (ii) some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of moral beliefs does not 
constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypothetical agent (Shafer-Landau 
2012: 1). There have been many objections to moral realism on evolutionary grounds 
(Street 2006; Joyce 2007: ch. 6; Horn forthcoming; Greene 2008: 35-80; Kitcher 2007; 
Ruse and Wilson 1986: 173-192).2 Here I will focus on what I consider the most popular 
type of evolutionary objection—what I’ll call the Standard EDA: 
The Standard EDA 
1. Epistemological Premise: If (a) moral realism is true, (b) evolution has strongly 
influenced our moral faculties in ways that are doxastically discriminating, and (c) 
there is no independent confirmation of the reliability of those faculties, then we 
have no positive moral knowledge. 
2. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our moral faculties in ways 
that are doxastically discriminating. 
3. Autonomy: There is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral 
faculties. 
4. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. 
 
                                                 
2 I make no claims to perfectly summarize any author’s views; I attempt here to construct the best possible 
objection that makes sense of what such authors say.  
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I’ll explain (2) and (3) before explaining (1)—but first, a terminological point. “Positive 
moral knowledge” is knowledge of a positive moral claim. A positive moral claim is one 
that attributes a moral predicate to something. Examples include “Stealing is wrong” and 
“It would be generous to buy this man a meal.” Likewise, when I later talk of “positive 
moral beliefs,” I mean only “belief in a positive moral claim.” 
Regarding (2), a faculty is influenced by X in a “doxastically discriminating” way 
iff the faculty is, in virtue of X, disposed to produce beliefs with certain propositional 
contents rather than others. Consider the belief that incest is wrong. A human who believes 
that incest is wrong is more likely to have offspring who can pass on their genetic material 
than a human who doesn’t have this belief. This is because incest increases the chances of 
sterility or deformation in one’s offspring, and believing that incest is wrong will make one 
less likely to engage in it. So, evolution selects for the belief that incest is wrong (or 
something like it).3 
Premise (3) is an autonomy thesis about the moral: we cannot confirm the reliability 
of our moral faculties except by showing that they have generated (mostly) true moral 
beliefs. But this cannot be done without assuming either the reliability of our moral 
faculties or the truth of our moral beliefs. For example, there is no moral almanac by which 
we can check the moral facts. 
 Premise (1) is the most obscure, partly because, as Shafer-Landau (2012) points 
out, there are so many ways of understanding why the consequent might follow from (a-
                                                 
3 Some might wonder at the idea that evolution could influence our mental faculties at all. But evolutionary 
psychologists propose that evolution could explain both physiological and psychological phenomena. For a 
fuller account of this proposal, see James (2011): 18-19. 
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c). Here is one way it has been defended (Joyce 2007: ch. 6; Bedke 2009; Clarke-Doane 
2012): 
 Insensitivity 
5. If (a-c) hold, then we would have the positive moral beliefs we do regardless of 
whether they are true.  
6. If we would believe that P regardless of whether P, then we do not know that P. 
7. Therefore, if (a-c) hold, then we have no positive moral knowledge. 
 
The plausibility of Insensitivity is not very important here: I give it just as an example of 
how (1) is defended. But briefly, (6) is supposed to be an intuitively plausible 
epistemological principle. (5) is claimed to hold because evolution selects for the content 
of our beliefs, not their truth. It is adaptive for you to believe that you ought to take care of 
your children regardless of whether it is true. 
However, let me emphasize that there are many ways of arguing for (1), and no part 
of my argument here depends on any one in particular. Furthermore, there may be reasons 
to doubt (5)—for example, Fitzpatrick (2014) argues that (5) presupposes that evolution is 
the only influence on our moral judgments. But I offer Insensitivity simply to aid in 
understanding some of the typical rationales that underlie the Standard EDA.  
SECTION 2: OBJECTIONS TO THE STANDARD EDA  
 
The Standard EDA, however appealing, has its share of problems. In this section I 
will summarize four popular, quite strong objections to it. I do not claim that proponents 
of the Standard EDA have no reply to any of these objections. However, in §4, I’ll argue 
that the New EDA fares better with regard to all of them. 
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The Limited Explanation Objection 
 
The first objection, one that has received wide support, I will call the limited 
explanation objection (Shafer Landau 2012: 5-8; Fitzpatrick 2014: 241-246; Parfit 2011: 
534-538; Huemer 2008b: 368-392; James 2011: 79-81; Copp 2008: 194; Street 2006: 155). 
It essentially consists of a denial of the empirical premise, (2). Proponents of the objection 
grant that there are some moral beliefs that have clear and plausible evolutionary 
explanations (like the belief that incest is wrong). But there are other moral beliefs that do 
not have such clear evolutionary explanations (e.g., the belief that all human persons have 
equal and inalienable rights).  
With such undebunked beliefs in hand, the realist can take the limited explanation 
objection in two different directions. She can argue—as Michael Huemer (2008b), Joshua 
Greene (2008), and Peter Singer (2005) each do—that we should abandon our debunked 
beliefs while retaining our undebunked beliefs. Though (on a realistic picture) we might 
have to abandon many of our moral beliefs, we still have moral knowledge, and so the 
Standard EDA fails. We may even end up with a more coherent set of moral beliefs. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to gain back knowledge of our previously 
debunked beliefs from the undebunked ones. For example, there is a good evolutionary 
explanation of why we believe that we ought to take care of our children. But there isn’t as 
clear of an explanation of the belief that we ought to take care of any helpless person whose 
existence resulted partially from our voluntary action. And, in combination with some 
uncontroversial empirical premises—that my child is helpless, a person, and resulted 
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partially from my voluntary action—this broader principle entails that I ought to take care 
of my children. So, I can know the latter, even though belief in it has an evolutionary 
explanation, because I can infer it from undebunked beliefs. (Maybe there are problems 
with the example; it is meant only as an illustration.) Whichever of these two strategies the 
realist takes, she can retain a substantial amount of positive moral knowledge. 
Now, the standard debunker does have some available replies. She might argue, 
e.g., that while the supposedly undebunked beliefs don’t admit of direct evolutionary 
explanations, they are indirectly explained by evolution (see James 2011: 2.4). But as 
mentioned earlier, I will not flesh out the dialectic any further. Hopefully, it is clear that 
the standard debunker has her work cut out for her, and it is unclear whether she will be 
able to answer the objection.  
The Independent Confirmation Objection  
 
Russ Shafer-Landau (2012: 33-35) targets premise (3) of the Standard EDA, 
claiming that there may be a source of independent confirmation of the reliability of our 
moral faculties. He claims that we can show that a doxastic faculty is reliable by showing 
that it is either identical to or a species of a doxastic faculty that we have independent 
warrant for believing to be reliable. In the moral case, this would be independent 
confirmation in that it does not assume the reliability of our moral faculties, or the truth of 
any given moral belief. Furthermore, this confirmation is compatible with the autonomy of 
the moral domain—i.e., that no moral beliefs can be derived from non-moral ones.  
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Shafer-Landau suggests that whatever faculties generate our non-moral synthetic a 
priori knowledge might also generate some set of our moral beliefs. And we have good 
reason to trust these faculties, which generate judgments such as that justified true belief is 
insufficient for knowledge, and that nothing can be red all over and green all over at the 
same time. But plausibly, those very same faculties also generate our a priori moral beliefs, 
such as that it is pro tanto wrong to cause an innocent person to suffer. So we have good 
reason to trust (at least) the faculties that generate our a priori moral beliefs. And it stands 
to reason that, in the way mentioned in the prior sub-section, from this base we could derive 
knowledge of many a posteriori moral claims. Again, I do not claim here that the standard 
debunker has no possible reply to this objection—he may, e.g., argue that the faculty that 
generates our a priori moral beliefs is not identical to/a species of any faculty that reliably 
generates non-moral synthetic a priori beliefs. But he has his work cut out for him here. 
The Overgeneralization Objection  
 
Some have argued that the Standard EDA—particularly the epistemological 
premise—is overbroad (Huemer 2008a: 218-219; Enoch 2011: 175-176; Shafer-Landau 
2012: 22; Vavova 2014: 82-83; Bedke 2009; Clarke-Doane 2012; see also Plantinga 1993: 
ch. 12). It seems to entail that if realism about a domain D is true, then strong evolutionary 
influence on D-faculties entails D-skepticism. But our perceptual faculties have been 
strongly influenced by evolution, as have our mathematical faculties. So, if realism in these 
domains is true, then we have no perceptual or mathematical knowledge. But if so, the 
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objectors claim, there is certainly something wrong with the Standard EDA: certainly 
perceptual (if not mathematical) realism is true. Since we have perceptual (and 
mathematical) knowledge, we can justifiably dismiss the Standard EDA, since it implies 
that we do not. Once again, the standard debunker may have a plausible response. The 
standard debunker could, e.g., deny mathematical realism and argue that her reasoning does 
not extend to the perceptual domain since evolution selects for true perceptual beliefs (but 
for a problem with the latter, see Street (forthcoming b: 25-28). However—the old 
refrain—my point is simply that the path to a satisfactory response is not clear, and may be 
impassible.  
Third Factor Responses  
 
A fourth type of objection to the Standard EDA is what has been called a third 
factor response. Such responses target the epistemological premise, claiming that even if 
evolution has influenced our moral faculties and there is no independent confirmation of 
them, we could still be justified in our moral beliefs. Third factor responses generally start 
by assuming the truth of a substantive moral principle (though for a notable exception, see 
Behrends 2013).  They then show how, on this assumption, evolution predictably brings us 
to have (at least some) true moral beliefs, even though it doesn’t select for the truth of those 
beliefs. Many third factor responses have been proposed (Behrends 2013; Brosnan 2011; 
Enoch 2010 and 2011: ch. 7; Skarsaune 2011; Wielenberg 2010 and 2014: ch. 4). It will 
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suffice for my purposes to briefly outline two prominent ones—David Enoch’s and Erik 
Wielenberg’s. 
 Enoch asks us to assume (plausibly) that our survival—or whatever evolution 
“aims” at—is at least somewhat good. This makes it plausible that anything that promotes 
our survival (or whatever) is good. But now consider how evolution influences us to act in 
ways that promote our survival: often when Φing promotes survival, it is adaptive for us to 
believe that Φing is good—this makes us more likely to Φ. But now it’s much less of a 
surprise that many of our moral beliefs are true: when Φing promotes survival, then (a) it 
is good (by our assumption) and (b) we are likely to believe that it is good. That our beliefs 
about goodness coincide with the facts about goodness is no longer a mystery. (As Enoch 
acknowledges, there may still be some explaining to do. This is unimportant here.)  
 Wielenberg attempts to defend (some of) our knowledge of rights. Assume, he says, 
the substantive moral principle that one has rights whenever one has certain mental 
capacities (call them “C”). The precise nature of C is unimportant, except for the following 
sufficient condition: whenever one has the capacity to form beliefs, one has C. Now 
imagine that I believe that I have rights. Because I have a belief, I have C. And because I 
have C, I have rights. So, on the assumption of one moral principle, we get the following 
result: whenever I believe I have rights, I actually do. Again, on one assumption, it’s no 
longer surprising that a large class of our moral beliefs are true. 
 That’s a very abbreviated introduction to the third factor response to the Standard 
EDA. There is much more to be said about each of the two exemplar views: for example, 
in each case, our knowledge of a limited class of moral claims might be expanded (via, 
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e.g., coherence relations) to other moral claims. Furthermore, there may be ways that the 
standard debunker can reply to the likes of Enoch and Wielenberg (I discuss one such way 
in §4). But once again, it won’t be easy.  
This concludes my consideration of common objections to the Standard EDA. I do 
not claim that there are no other strong objections. These four, however, seem to me to be 
four of the strongest. And, as I’ll show in §4, the New EDA fares better in replying to each 
of them. 
SECTION 3: THE NEW EDA  
 
I think that there is a distinct EDA—the New EDA—that is plausible in its own 
right, in addition to its advantages vis-à-vis the above objections. In this section, I’ll outline 
the New EDA and defend its premises. Aside from the incorporation of a more complex 
epistemology in the New EDA, there is one basic difference between that argument and 
the Standard EDA. While the Standard EDA debunks moral beliefs on the basis of their 
contents, the New EDA debunks moral beliefs on the basis of a claim that they all entail. 
The Standard EDA, for example, claims that evolution selects for the disposition to judge 
that it’s wrong not to take care of one’s children, and it’s on this basis that we have no 
knowledge of that claim. The New EDA, on the other hand, will claim that the judgment 
that it’s wrong not to take care of one’s children entails a claim belief in which is defeated. 
In fact, this claim, which turns out to be that categorical reasons exist, is entailed by all 
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positive moral claims. From this, given some plausible epistemological principles, it 
follows that if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge.  
 Before I turn to the New EDA, let me introduce and define an integral term: 
“categorical reason.” Defining this term is somewhat complicated by the fact that it is 
commonly defined in two different ways. According to the weaker definition: 
CR1:  A has a categorical reason to Φ in circumstances C iff A has a reason to Φ 
and any agent in C has a reason to Φ. 
 
And according to the stronger definition: 
CR2: A has a categorical reason to Φ in circumstances C iff A has a reason to Φ 
and that reason obtains regardless of what desires (broadly construed) A has 
or what judgments she makes. 
 
On this second reading, categorical reasons are just what many call “external reasons” (as 
in Williams 1981). I believe that the New EDA can be soundly formulated on either 
reading, though I have CR2 in mind in what follows.   
 Here is the New EDA: 
 The New EDA 
8. Assume that moral realism is true. 
9. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical 
reasons. 
10. Autonomy: There is no independent justification for belief in categorical reasons. 
11. If (9) and (10), then our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. 
12. So, our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. (9,10,11) 
13. All positive moral claims entail that at least one categorical reason exists, and we 
are justified in believing that this entailment holds. 
14. If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q 
is defeated, then we do not know that P. 
15. So, we do not have any positive moral knowledge. (12,13,14) 




In the rest of this section, I will defend (9), (10), (11), (13), and (14). 
Defense of (9): The Empirical Business  
 
(9) is an empirical premise. Since I am just a humble philosopher, I cannot mount 
a full defense of this premise. What I can do, however, is show why there is at least enough 
support for (9) for us to worry about what would follow from it. This is, after all, all the 
standard debunker has (Street 2006: §3). 
 Let me start with a clarification. To say that evolution has strongly influenced our 
belief in categorical reasons does not mean that evolution has caused us to believe that 
categorical reasons exist. “Categorical reason,” after all, is a philosophical term of art. 
However, suppose that we had reason to think that evolution had favored humans who have 
a sense that there are some actions (or desires, etc.) that are favored no matter what. This 
would count as evidence of a strong evolutionary influence on our belief in categorical 
reasons, and thus would support (9). Henceforth, let “our belief in categorical reasons” be 
understood in this pre-theoretical way. 
 There is some reason to think such influence has occurred. The basic idea behind 
(9) is that those humans are more adaptive who believe that they have a reason to (e.g.) 
take care of their children no matter what they desire. Why is this? Because they will be 
more likely to take care of their children than if they merely desired to do so. As Richard 
Joyce points out, a mere desire to do something can easily be overridden by stronger 
desires, and long-term desires can be hastily re-evaluated in light of short-term desires. 
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Desires are, in Joyce’s (2001: 136-137) terms, “unreliable things” (see also Olson 2011). 
We will be far more adaptive if we believe that some things are favored/required no matter 
what we desire.  
Further support for (9) is based on thinking about cooperative situations that can be 
modelled on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (James 2011: §2.6). These are cases in which multiple 
organisms would be better off (reproductively speaking) helping each other, but in which, 
if they deliberate from the standpoint of their self-interest, they rationally ought to play the 
free-rider. As James (2011: 59) notes, the problem in need of a solution, in such cases, is 
to “design individuals to establish and preserve cooperative alliances despite the temptation 
not to cooperate.” A community of individuals who have some mechanism that trumps 
their desires in favor of cooperative action will do better, reproductively speaking, than a 
community of individuals that does not. Such a mechanism is provided by a sense of having 
categorical reason to follow through on promises, to help those who help you, etc. With 
such a sense, even where you believe that it would be in your best interest to defect, you 
won’t. In sum, we seem to have enough reason to believe (9) that we should worry about 
what follows from it. 
Defense of (10): No Independent Justification  
 
So let’s assume that evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical 
reasons. Now I want to show that there is no independent justification for belief in 
categorical reasons. First off, what does it mean for a justification to be independent? A 
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justification for belief in categorical reasons is independent iff it doesn’t rely on either (a) 
our intuitions about what categorical reasons we have, or on (b) our belief or intuition that 
P, where P would entail the existence of a categorical reason. 
 And, as it turns out, there is no such justification. For brevity’s sake, I’ll consider 
here just one well-known argument for categorical reasons. I footnote a second, for 
variety’s sake, at the end of the section. Consider David Enoch’s (2011: 261-262) 
“Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy” argument against existence-internalism—the thesis that one 
has a reason to Φ only if there is a sound deliberative route from one’s existing motivations 
to one’s Φing. Imagine that Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has no desire that would be 
promoted, even under ideal deliberative conditions, by refraining from harming Victim. 
Enoch argues: 
17. If existence-internalism is true, then Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has no reason not 
to hurt Victim. 
18. But clearly Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy does have a reason not to hurt Victim.  
19. Therefore, existence-internalism is false. 
 
(17) follows from our supposition that Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has no desire which 
would be served by refraining from hurting Victim, even under ideal deliberative 
conditions. But, so (18) claims, he does have a reason not to perform said heinous act. So, 
he must have a reason that obtains regardless of his desires, and that entails the existence 
of at least one categorical reason. 
 The problem, however, is apparent. The plausibility of (18) depends on our intuition 
that Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has a categorical reason not to hurt Victim. The intuition 
that supports (18) is the same intuition that I would defend by saying “No, Sufficiently Bad 
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Bad-Guy has a reason not to hurt Victim, no matter what!” In fact, if I understand who 
Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy is, and I understand what a categorical reason is, then I can’t 
believe (18) without believing that his reason not to hurt Victim is a categorical one. So 
this argument for categorical reasons doesn’t give us independent justification for belief in 
them, whatever its other merits are as an argument.4 
Perhaps there are some arguments for the existence of categorical reasons that are 
entirely distinct from both that given in the text and in footnote 3, but I am unaware of 
them. Such arguments, I suspect, would not constitute independent justification of belief 
in categorical reasons; but then again, I would have to see the arguments first.  
Defense of (11): Why Evolutionary Pressures Defeat Belief  
 
So now let’s assume that (9) and (10) are plausible. What follows from their 
conjunction? In (11) we get an answer analogous to (1), the epistemological premise of the 
Standard EDA: if (9) and (10)—and assuming moral realism—then our belief in 
categorical reasons is defeated. All I mean by such “defeat” is the classic notion from 
epistemology. A defeater D for A’s belief that P is a true proposition such that if A 
justifiably believed that D, then A would be unjustified in believing that P. When D obtains, 
we can say that A’s belief that P is defeated. One standard example is a Gettier case: you 
                                                 
4 Shafer-Landau (2009) gives an independent argument for categorical reasons:  the “fanatic” has no 
commitment promoted by not perpetrating an act of terror, and so has no non-categorical reason not to do 
so. However, since he is intuitively blameworthy, he must have a categorical reason to refrain. Yet, 
whereas Enoch’s argument violates (a) in the definition of independence, Shafer-Landau’s relies on an 
intuition that something obtains (the fanatic’s blameworthiness) that would entail the existence of a 
categorical reason, violating (b) in the definition of independence.  
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have a true, justified belief that it is 10:39, based on your view of a clock that reads “10:39.” 
But your belief may even now be defeated, since the clock you’re looking at is broken and 
you just happened to look at it when it read correctly. The proposition “The clock is 
broken” is a defeater for your belief that it is 10:39 because, if you justifiably believed that 
the clock was broken, you would not be justified in the belief that it is 10:39.  
I said above that there are many ways of arguing for the epistemological premise 
of the Standard EDA, giving Insensitivity as a notable example. The same is true regarding 
(11), I suspect. (Since the New EDA is, well, new, I cannot appeal to notable defenses of 
that premise.)  In this section I will offer just one defense of (11), based on an argument 
from insensitivity. Though I do in fact think that this argument is sound, there may well be 
other appealing defenses of the premise.  
 Here is the argument, which runs along the same lines as Insensitivity: 
 New Insensitivity 
20. If (9) evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons and (10) 
there is no independent justification for belief in categorical reasons, then for any 
agent A, A would believe in categorical reasons regardless of whether they exist 
or not. 
21. If A would believe that P regardless of whether P, then A’s belief that P is defeated. 
22. Therefore, if (9) and (10), then for any agent A, then A’s belief in categorical 
reasons is defeated. 
 
The justification for (20) runs roughly as follows. Evolution selects for adaptive traits, and 
your belief that you have a categorical reason to (say) take care of your children would be 
adaptive regardless of whether you actually do have such a reason. The belief that there 
are any categorical reasons at all is similarly adaptive (and thus selected for) because 
without it, you could not believe that you have any particular categorical reason. Now, a 
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belief that P can be strongly influenced by such a truth-insensitive cause and yet still be 
sensitive to the truth—if the agent in question has some independent justification for the 
belief that P (e.g., God has told him that P), and his belief is also strongly influenced by 
this consideration. However, when there is a truth-insensitive cause of our belief that P—
as evolution is, in this case—and there is no independent justification for believing that P, 
we would believe it regardless of whether P.5 
(21) seems to me an eminently plausible epistemological principle. When I would 
believe that P no matter whether P, this counts as a defeater for my belief that P. That is, if 
I would believe that P regardless of its truth, and if on top of that I justifiably believed this 
about myself, then I would not be justified in my belief that P. Suppose I believe that I’m 
a great basketball player. Then I find out (with justification) that, due to my immense self-
confidence, I would believe this regardless of whether it was true or false. I would no longer 
be justified in my belief that I am a great basketball player. (Notice that I am not committed 
to the claim that, when A’s belief that P is insensitive, it is unjustified.) 
Defense of (13): Moral Claims Entail Categorical Reasons  
 
Call the thesis that all positive moral claims entail that some particular categorical 
reason exists “the entailment claim.” The entailment claim entails (13), since (i) if all 
positive moral claims entail the existence of some particular categorical reason, then they 
                                                 
5 To avoid problems resulting from the metaphysical necessity of some moral claims, we should understand 
the counterfactuals here to quantify over all conceptually possible worlds, as in Clarke-Doane (2012): 320-
321. 
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entail that at least one categorical reason exists, and (ii) an argument that all positive moral 
claims entail the existence of at least one categorical reason is also an argument that we are 
justified in believing this to be true. So I need to show here that, if moral realism is true, 
then the entailment claim is true. I’ll give two arguments to this effect. But first let me 
clarify the entailment claim. Consider the following four attenuations of it: 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each positive moral claim entails a 
categorical reason to do anything. I might have a categorical reason to feel a certain 
way, or to desire something in particular. E.g., that some act is generous may entail 
that I have a categorical reason to like when people perform that act. 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each attribution of a given moral property 
M entails a categorical reason to do (or feel, desire, etc.) the same thing in every 
situation.  That some act is M may give me a categorical reason to Φ in one situation 
and Ψ in another. E.g., that some act is generous may in one instance give me 
categorical reason to perform it; in another circumstance it may give me categorical 
reason to help someone perform it. 
 The entailment claim does not mean that each positive moral claim entails an all-
things-considered categorical reason. Positive moral claims often entail only pro 
tanto reasons. E.g., that some act is generous may give me pro tanto categorical 
reason to perform it, although I have trumping reasons to refrain.  
 The entailment claim does not mean that any agent with a positive moral belief also 
believes that some categorical reason exists. For all it says, even agents who are 
fully competent with moral concepts may be unaware of the entailment claim.  
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So in sum, all positive moral claims entail a pro tanto categorical reason to Φ, where Φ is 
not necessarily an action and can vary across situations for a given moral claim. Finally, 
even where a positive moral claim is true, it is possible that not all agents who are 
competent with moral concepts will be aware of this entailment. Since each positive moral 
claim entails that some particular categorical reason obtains, each also entails that at least 
one categorical reason obtains. So, if the entailment claim is true, then (13) is true. 
 There has been some dispute over the entailment claim—mostly within the debate 
over moral error theory. There are many who think that the entailment claim is true—that, 
in fact, it is a conceptual truth (Olson 2011; Joyce 2001: 175-177).6 Yet there are also some 
who deny it (Foot 1972; Finlay 2008). Such denial is not worrisome for my argument here, 
because the arguments against the entailment claim rely on premises inimical to moral 
realism (as in Finlay 2008). My claim is that if moral realism is true, then the entailment 
claim is true (although not necessarily conceptually true).  
 I’ll give two arguments for the entailment claim. The first is the weakest, and it 
comes cheaply. Consider: what is it that makes moral claims moral, and not some other 
type of claim? It can’t be their normativity: prudential claims are normative, as are some 
epistemic claims. Nor can it be that they are other-directed: many claims about etiquette 
are other-directed. The entailment claim provides an answer: what makes moral claims 
moral is that they entail categorical reasons. I will leave this as a speculation (although see 
Joyce 2011, who agrees with me on this point)—whether the distinction between moral 
                                                 
6 Outside of debates about error theory, I think Parfit (2011: 283-288) is committed to the entailment claim, 
and Enoch (2011: 94) expresses sympathy for it. 
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and non-moral claims is important, and whether there are other plausible ways to draw the 
distinction, are beyond my ken.  
 What I consider a second, stronger argument for the entailment claim relies directly 
on the commitments of moral realism. Without the entailment claim, we cannot explain the 
type of authority that moral claims have, according to realists. This is clearest in the types 
of cases that Enoch is considering. Sufficiently Bad Bad-Guy has reason not to hurt Victim. 
But according to the moral realist, his reason not to hurt Victim is not conditional on his 
having an interest in Victim’s continued well-being, or on his desire not to see anyone 
suffer, or on any judgment that he makes. He shouldn’t do it no matter what! Even claims 
about what would be virtuous, or what states of affairs are good, have distinctive authority 
over us. Whatever the generosity of an action gives you reason to do/feel/think/etc., this 
reason is not contingent on your having any specific desires or judgments. This authority 
that moral claims have over us, according to realists, is explained only by their entailing 
categorical reasons (for similar points, see Parfit 2011: 283-288 and Joyce 2001: ch. 2). 
 Think of the matter a different way, via example. At the very least, if moral realism 
is true, then when some act is generous one has categorical reason to perform it in certain 
counterfactual situations. Surely if some act is generous, then ceteris paribus—i.e., where 
no energy is lost on your part by performing it that wouldn’t otherwise be lost, where you 
sacrifice nothing that you want by performing it, etc.—you have a categorical reason to 
perform it. In the specified situation, anyone, no matter what they desire or judge, has a 
reason to act generously. Similarly, assume that the absence of physical conflict is good. If 
we consider a situation where, by the press of a button, you can make it the case that 
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physical conflict is avoided, and where it otherwise wouldn’t be, and where furthermore 
there are no competing goods that are sacrificed by one’s pushing the button—well, don’t 
we have reason, no matter what we desire, to push the button? If so, then if moral realism 
is true, even such positive moral claims as these entail the existence of a categorical reason. 
 Anti-realists are not similarly committed to the entailment claim—at least not all of 
them. Consider Streetian constructivism: the fact that A has a reason to Φ is constituted by 
the fact that the proposition “A has a reason to Φ” is entailed by A’s other judgments about 
reasons, the non-normative facts, and the constitutive standards for judgments about 
reasons (Street 2009; Street 2010; Street 2012; Street forthcoming). Street-type 
constructivism actually entails the falsity of the entailment claim, when that claim is read 
according to CR2. According to the Street-type constructivist, if moral claims entail reasons 
at all, they can’t be categorical reasons—all of A’s reasons are constituted by facts about 
what normative judgments she makes, and so clearly do not obtain regardless of what 
judgments she makes. The upshot of all this is that moral realists are committed to the 
entailment claim, and thus (13), while at least some anti-realist views—I suspect most—
are not.  
But perhaps, after all that I’ve said, there are still those who think that they can be 
moral realists without committing to the entailment claim. Yet even if so, the New EDA 
will simply apply to the type of realism committed to the entailment claim. And any type 
of realism that is not so committed will have a new problem: that of either explaining the 
authority of moral claims, or explaining away the appearance of such. 
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Defense of (14): The Epistemological Business  
 
We can’t get the conclusion of the New EDA without some principle linking the 
defeat of belief in an entailed claim with lack of knowledge of the claim doing the entailing. 
In other words, we need (14): If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, 
and our belief that Q is defeated, then we do not know that P. However, that claim is not 
only plausible on its face, but it follows from two other epistemological premises, each 
even more plausible than (14).  
 Here’s the argument: 
23. If my belief that P is defeated, then I do not know that P.  
24. If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q 
is defeated, then our belief that P is defeated.  
25. Therefore, if P entails Q, and our belief that Q is defeated, then we do not know 
that P. 
There are controversial claims that rely on (23)—e.g., attempts to provide necessary and 
sufficient conditions for knowledge. But (23) merely asserts a necessary condition on 
knowledge, and that is not controversial at all (Klein 1971; Lehrer and Paxson 1969). It 
serves as a good explanation of why, in at least some Gettier cases, the agent does not have 
knowledge: there’s some true proposition that, if the agent justifiably believed it, would 
entail that her belief is unjustified.  
 (24) is simply a closure principle for defeat, and it seems as plausible as any non-
trivial epistemological principle. Here’s an example that may help to illustrate that 
plausibility. Suppose I look at the clock and, seeing that it reads “2:14,” conclude that it is 
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afternoon. But the clock is broken, which defeats my belief that it is afternoon. I also 
believe that it is 2:14 p.m., which entails that it is afternoon. (24) says that, in this situation, 
my belief that it is 2:14 p.m. is also defeated.  
 I see no need to defend (24) further, since it is so plausible. But it just so happens 
that there is a valid argument for it, which only depends on a closure principle for 
justification: 
ClosureJ: If P entails Q, and I am justified in believing that P entails Q, then 
if my belief that Q is unjustified, then my belief that P is unjustified.  
 
I leave the defense of ClosureJ to others (Hawthorne 2004: ch. 1). Suffice it to say that it is 
as plausible a (non-trivial) principle as they come in epistemology. 
The argument for (24) is fairly complex. In what follows, recall that when A’s belief 
that P is defeated, there is some true proposition D such that, if A justifiably believed that 
D, then A would be unjustified in believing that P. The following argument actually shows 
something more specific than (24), but which entails (24)—that the same defeater that 
defeats belief that Q also defeats belief that P.  
26. P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and my belief that Q is defeated.  
(Assumption) 
27. P entails Q.  
(&Elim 26) 
28. There is some true proposition D and if I justifiably believed that D, then I would 
not be justified in believing that Q. 
(from 26) 
29. There is some true proposition D.  
(&Elim 28) 
30. If I justifiably believed that D, then I would not be justified in believing that Q. 
(&Elim 28) 
31. I am justified in believing that D.  
(Assumption) 
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32. I am not justified in believing that Q.  
(Elim 30, 31) 
33. If P entails Q, I am justified I believing this, and I am not justified in believing that 
Q, then I am not justified in believing that P.  
(ClosureJ ) 
34.  I am justified in believing that P entails Q.  
(&Elim 26) 
35. P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and I am not justified in believing that 
Q.  
(&Intro 27, 32, 34) 
36. I am not justified in believing that P.  
(Elim 33, 35) 
37. If I am justified in believing that D, then I am not justified in believing that P. 
 (Intro 31, 36) 
38. There is some true proposition D and if I am justified in believing that D, then I 
am not justified in believing that P (i.e., my belief that P is defeated).  
(&Intro 29, 37) 
39. Therefore, if P entails Q, I am justified in believing this, and my belief that Q is 
defeated, then my belief that P is defeated.  
(Intro 26, 38) 
 
The argument is sound so long as ClosureJ is true—as it almost surely is. 
In this section, I’ve defended the premises of the New EDA. I believe that defense 
has been successful, though merely suggestive at points (e.g., the empirical business). So 
at this point, it seems that realists ought to worry about whether the empirical premise is 
true. 
SECTION 4: REVISITING THE OBJECTIONS TO THE STANDARD EDA  
 
In this section, I argue that on top of the New EDA’s independent plausibility, it 
has far better replies than the Standard EDA to the four objections above. I’ll argue that 
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the New EDA has decisive replies to the first two objections, while it has distinct 
advantages over the Standard EDA with regard to the latter two.    
The New EDA’s Replies to the First Two Objections  
 
Recall the limited explanation objection: it hinged on the claim that there are some 
moral beliefs that do not easily admit of an evolutionary explanation. However, the New 
EDA can grant this. It’s empirical premise claims only the belief that categorical reasons 
exist has been strongly influenced by evolution. The Standard EDA’s empirical premise, 
on the other hand, claims that many different (moral) beliefs have been so influenced. If 
evolution has strongly influenced our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways, 
then we should expect (at the very least) most of our moral beliefs to be adaptive. This 
makes it easy for the realist to find moral beliefs that are not likely to have emerged as a 
result of adaptive pressures, thus causing the standard debunker worry in proportion to the 
number of non-adaptive beliefs on display. The empirical premise of the New EDA is not 
open to such criticism. It relies only on the claim that one belief is adaptive, and it turns 
out to be clear how that belief would be adaptive. Let the contents of positive moral beliefs 
be what they may—e.g., what exactly we ought to do, or what acts are generous—the New 
EDA still entails that there is no moral knowledge. 
The independent confirmation objection, recall, was that we can independently 
confirm a doxastic faculty if we can show that it is identical to or a species of a type of 
faculty we know to be reliable, regardless of whether our moral faculties are reliable. It is 
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clear why this objection does not apply to the New EDA: I am not targeting our moral 
faculties at all! Rather, I claim that a particular belief is defeated, since it was formed in a 
way that is not sensitive to the truth, and I derive the lack of positive moral knowledge 
from the defeat of this one belief. So Shafer-Landau’s objection just does not apply to the 
New EDA.  
One might think that my reply here is cheap, and that regardless of whether the 
objection applies to the New EDA, Shafer-Landau can show that our moral faculties are 
reliable. Doesn’t the reliability of our moral faculties outweigh (in some sense) the defeat 
of something entailed by our positive moral beliefs? If so, we could have positive moral 
knowledge even where our positive moral beliefs entailed a defeated belief. But this is no 
good. Even if we grant that our moral faculties are a species of some generally reliable 
faculty, this gives us merely pro tanto reason to trust them. If our moral beliefs are 
defeated—as I have argued they are—then we no longer have reason to trust them. As the 
plane crash survivor trudges through the desert, he may have pro tanto reason to trust his 
beliefs about the convenience store he seems to see up ahead, since he knows that his 
faculty of vision is generally reliable. But that reason can be undermined if he learns that 
this particular belief is defeated—here the defeater is the claim that in circumstances such 
as those our survivor is in, we often seem to see things that aren’t there. In the same way, 
even if Shafer-Landau is right, his objection does nothing to threaten the New EDA. We 
could start with pro tanto reason to trust our moral faculties, but if I’m right, we still have 
no positive moral knowledge.  
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The New EDA’s Reply to the Overgeneralization Objection  
 
The New EDA has an important advantage over the Standard EDA in replying to 
the overgeneralization objection. Recall the objection: if evolutionary pressures undermine 
moral knowledge on the assumption of moral realism, then they also undermine perceptual 
(or mathematical) knowledge on the assumption of perceptual (or mathematical) realism. 
It might seem that both EDAs are equally susceptible to the objection: after all, both claim 
that evolutionary influence of some kind undermines knowledge. And neither EDA has 
some special capacity to deny evolutionary influence on our perceptual or mathematical 
faculties or beliefs. So, perhaps both EDAs overgeneralize, if either does. 
However, I think that the New EDA has at least the following advantage in replying 
to the objection: whereas the Standard EDA targets our moral faculties in general, the New 
EDA targets a particular belief. But it seems that, if there has been evolutionary influence 
in the perceptual or mathematical realm, it has largely been influence on the respective 
faculties. No particular perceptual belief seems to have been selected for (e.g., that there is 
a table in front of me): such beliefs seem far too fine-grained to be the object of direct 
evolutionary influence. Similarly for mathematical beliefs: e.g., the belief that 679 – 456 = 
223 is not directly selected for. And this means that the Standard EDA overgeneralizes to 
these realms, since it claims that evolutionary influence on a faculty means that the beliefs 
produced by that faculty don’t count as knowledge. The New EDA, on the other hand, 
claims only that direct evolutionary influence on a belief means that that very belief does 
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not count as knowledge. It can allow that indirect evolutionary influence on a belief (via 
influence on the faculty that produced that belief) doesn’t undermine knowledge.  
One might worry that the New EDA will still overgeneralize if perceptual or 
mathematical claims entailed the existence of a categorical reason. But such an entailment 
does not obtain. That 2 + 2 = 4 does not entail the existence of a categorical reason. Neither 
does the claim that there is a table in front of me. These are just not the kind of facts that 
entail any kind of reasons: whereas claims about reasons are normative, these are purely 
non-normative claims. And of course, it’s a commonplace in ethics (and normative theory 
in general) that a normative claim does not follow from a purely non-normative claim.  
For these reasons, I think that the New EDA has a better reply to the 
overgeneralization objection than does the Standard EDA. But unlike the New EDA’s 
responses to the first two objections, the response here does not seem utterly conclusive. 
So I claim only that the New EDA’s reply is superior to the Standard EDA’s, not that it is 
ultimately successful. 
The New EDA’s Reply to Third Factor Views  
 
Recall the general form of a third factor response: each generally starts by assuming 
a substantive moral principle. It then shows how evolution predictably brings us to have 
(at least some) true moral beliefs, even though it doesn’t select for the truth of those beliefs. 
I am not convinced that either EDA has a knock-down reply to this type of objection. 
However, it seems to me that the most promising reply available to either EDA works much 
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better for the New EDA than for the Standard EDA, and in this respect the former is better 
off than the latter.  
If any EDA is to stand against third factor responses, it must be because those 
responses beg the question against the relevant EDA. Several philosophers have argued 
that this is indeed the case, with regard to the Standard EDA (Shafer-Landau 2012: 33-34; 
Behrends 2013: 7-8; Horn forthcoming; Vavova 2014: 81; Vavova 2015: 111-112). It’s 
easiest to see why when we look at Enoch’s view, which assumes that survival is good. 
Belief in this claim has a clear evolutionary explanation (this is, in fact, integral to the 
success of Enoch’s reply). This belief is thus part of the target of the Standard EDA: it is 
such claims that the argument attempts to show that we can’t know, if realism is true. But 
surely we shouldn’t crucially rely on our belief that P, when replying to an argument that 
purports to show that we don’t know that P! So, Enoch shouldn’t rely on the claim that 
survival is good, since the Standard EDA attempts to show that he doesn’t know this.  
Consider the following analogy: you know that taking a certain pill will cause you 
to believe that Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo (Joyce 2007: 179-180). You know 
that you have taken such a pill. Are you rationally permitted to rely on your belief that 
Napoleon won Waterloo in assessing whether you know that Napoleon won Waterloo? Of 
course not—to do so would assume the very knowledge in question. For the same reason, 
we cannot assume the truth of any positive moral claim when assessing whether we have 
any positive moral knowledge.  
My goal here is not to prove that this strategy for replying to third factor views is 
ultimately viable. That would require fuller argument. But I do hope it’s clear that this is 
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the best option for the standard debunker to take in replying to third factor views. The jig 
is up, so to speak, if the standard debunker allows her critic to appeal to some positive 
moral claims in his response (although for an independent line of objection, see Joyce 
2016). 
However, when applying this argumentative strategy, the standard debunker will 
run into a problem that the new debunker won’t. To see why, let’s look to Wielenberg’s 
third factor response. His substantive moral principle is that any person with C has rights. 
But notice: this is precisely the sort of claim that seems incapable of direct evolutionary 
explanation, since it’s unclear why it would be adaptive to believe it. In fact, it might be 
downright disadvantageous: if I have the belief in question, in many circumstances I will 
put my kin on equal standing with those who are completely unrelated to me, lowering the 
chances of passing on my genes. In this way, the standard debunker’s appeal to the 
question-begging strategy depends crucially on her ability to reply to the limited 
explanation objection. 
To state the point modestly: it is unclear whether evolution has had a strong 
influence on our belief that all beings with C have rights. And it seems to me that, in such 
a situation, it is permissible to rely on this belief in replying to the Standard EDA. Return 
to our analogy: Wielenberg’s case is like not having good reason to believe that you have 
taken the Napoleon Pill. In such a situation, it is plausible that you can rationally rely on 
your belief that Napoleon won Waterloo. So, the Standard EDA is susceptible to at least 
one third factor response even if we grant that others (like Enoch’s) are question-begging.  
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However, we have seen that the New EDA targets all moral beliefs and is therefore 
immune to the limited explanation objection. For this reason, both third factor responses 
under consideration will beg the question against it, if either does. So will most third factor 
views, since most assume a positive moral claim. But the New EDA has it that all moral 
claims entail a categorical reason, which (long story short) means that we can’t have 
knowledge of any positive moral claim. So, all third factor views that assume a substantive 
normative claim—including both Wielenberg’s and Enoch’s—will beg the question 
against the New EDA by assuming what it purports to disprove: that we have any positive 
moral knowledge. So in sum, the Standard EDA has a vulnerability to third factor views 
that the New EDA does not. It is a derivative vulnerability—deriving from the Standard 
EDA’s vulnerability to the limited explanation objection—but a vulnerability nonetheless.  
The New EDA’s reply here is not decisive. It depends on whether the question-
begging reply works in general; it is also vulnerable to any third factor response which can 
manage not to assume a positive moral claim, such as Behrends (2013). But the New EDA 
has a very important advantage over the Standard EDA in replying to third factor views, 
just as it does in replying to all of the objections mentioned here. 
CONCLUSION  
 
 The fact that evolution has strongly influenced our moral beliefs seems worrying, 
at first glance, if the moral facts don’t depend constitutively on our attitudes. However, 
there are some deep problems that face the standard formulation of the argument. The New 
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EDA, which I have presented here, gives an independently plausible line of argument that 
avoids many of the problems with the Standard EDA. If that argument works, then moral 
realism entails moral skepticism—an intolerably high price for realists to pay. I cannot say 
here conclusively whether the argument succeeds—the state of empirical work is 
incomplete, and there are further questions to be answered regarding the overgeneralization 
and third factor objections. What I can say, however, is that this is a seriously worrisome 





















                                                 
7 For helpful feedback, I would like to thank Sinan Dogramaci, Casey Hart, Alex Hyun, Eric Sampson, 
Mark Schroeder, Russ Shafer-Landau, Sharon Street, two anonymous referees, and all the participants of 
the 2015 Texas Tech Graduate Conference on metaethics. 
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Chapter 2:  When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument 





According to a popular objection to moral realism, evolutionary forces have 
influenced our moral beliefs in such a way that, if realism is true, then we have no moral 
knowledge. But there are many defenders of realism who not only think that the objection 
fails, but in arguing that it fails rely on the very moral beliefs that are under attack. This 
has ignited a debate over whether such replies beg the question, with realists arguing that 
if such replies are off-limits in the moral case, then a far more general brand of skepticism 
follows.   
 In this paper, I give a probabilistic account of what’s objectionable about replies 
that rely on moral beliefs. I argue that the probabilistic account entails that certain realists 
(but not others) beg the question by relying on moral beliefs in their replies, and it does not 
objectionably overgeneralize. The probabilistic account thus allows the debunker to argue 
against only a certain type of realism. I conclude by considering whether the account 
debunks logical and mathematical realism, and whether, if so, that is a problem for the 
debunking argument against moral realism.  
                                                 
8 Based on Justin Morton (forthcoming) “When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument 
Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy: 1-16. 
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SECTION 1: SOME BACKGROUND  
 
Worries about evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs go back to Darwin 
himself [1871: 102]. But they have recently been harnessed into a fairly sophisticated 
argument against moral realism [Ruse and Wilson 1986; Street 2006; Joyce 2006; Kitcher 
2007; Greene 2008; Morton 2016; Horn 2017]. Moral realism is the thesis that (i) sincere 
moral judgments express beliefs, (ii) some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of 
moral beliefs does not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypothetical 
agent [see Shafer-Landau 2012: 1]. Here’s what I take to be the heart of the challenge:  
The Standard EDA 
1. Epistemological Premise: If moral realism is true and evolution has strongly 
influenced our moral faculties in such-and-such a way, then we have no substantive 
moral knowledge. 
2. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our moral faculties in such-
and-such a way. 
3. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no substantive moral knowledge. 
 
Two notes about the argument: first, as a simplifying assumption, let us suppose that there 
is no confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties that is independent of those 
faculties themselves [Shafer-Landau 2012: 4-5; Vavova 2014: 81]. Second, how ‘such-
and-such a way’ ought to be articulated is independent of whether the type of replies I’ll 
consider here work: those replies do not take issue with the way debunkers say evolution 
has influenced our moral faculties, so I will not address that issue here.  
 Many think that the best sort of reply for the realist is what I will call a first-order 
reply. A first-order reply is one that crucially assumes a substantive moral claim in replying 
to the Standard EDA. (On this definition, so-called ‘third-factor responses’ are a proper 
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subset of first-order replies.) What makes a moral claim substantive is hard to say: 
‘Discrimination on the basis of race is bad’ is substantive; ‘Either Bob’s discrimination 
was bad or it’s not the case that it was bad’ is not.9  
Enoch, for example, assumes that our survival, and thus whatever promotes it, are 
at least somewhat good.10 But often when Φing promotes survival, it is adaptive for us to 
believe that Φing is good—this makes us more likely to Φ. Yet now it’s much less of a 
surprise that many of our moral beliefs are true: when Φing promotes survival, then not 
only is it good, but we are likely to believe that it is good. So, on one substantive moral 
assumption, we see that our moral beliefs coincide with the facts.   
 Karl Schafer gives a different sort of first-order reply (we may here ignore his 
broader focus on normative knowledge). In discussing the non-normative properties that 
our normative faculties track, he argues that in many cases: 
These are all properties that we do, upon reflection, take to have normative 
significance. So in all these cases, our considered normative judgment is that the 
factors that shaped the development of our normative faculties do in fact have the 
relevant sort of normative significance. Thus, these judgments, plus evolutionary 
theory, do not immediately give us any reason to be sceptical of these faculties.  
[2010: 477] 
 
Here, Schafer employs a much broader first-order approach than Enoch: he assumes 
reliability concerning substantive moral claims in general.  
                                                 
9 We don’t need a precise definition: debunkers are targeting knowledge of claims like the first example, 
but not the second. Let the substantive moral claims be the ones knowledge of which debunkers are 
targeting.  
10 Enoch [2011: sec. 7.4.3]. Enoch thinks that the Standard EDA is an instance of a more general objection: 
that normative realists cannot explain the striking correlation between the normative facts and our 
normative beliefs. Enoch could still be replying to the Standard EDA: he’ll read ‘such-and-such a way’ as 
‘in such a way as to produce a striking correlation of fact and belief’. 
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 There are many other first-order replies, but we need not explore them here 
[Dworkin 1996: 125; Wielenberg 2010; Brosnan 2011; Parfit 2011: 532-533; Skarsaune 
2011; Setiya 2012: ch. 2]. Debunkers rightly find something fishy about such replies: they 
seem to assume exactly what is in question [Gibbard 2003: ch. 13; Shafer-Landau 2012: 
33-34; Behrends 2013: 7-8; Vavova 2014: 81; Vavova 2015: 111-112; Horn 2017; Street 
forthcoming: 25-28]! Street calls first-order replies ‘trivially question-begging’, arguing:   
The general question we are asking . . . is “Why think that the causes described by 
our best scientific explanations would have led us to the truth in this domain?” In 
answer to this question, it is unsatisfactory to reply, “My judgments in this domain 
are true, and they’re also the ones that the causes described by our best scientific 
explanations led me to.” Such a reply offers no reason for thinking that the causes 
led us to the truth; it merely reasserts that they did.  
[forthcoming: 26] 
 
It is not hard to sympathize with the intuition here. 
 The proponent of the first-order reply, however, argues that such question-begging 
is not problematic, since it is necessary in order to reply to skeptical worries in other 
domains [Bedke 2009: sec. 3.2; Schafer 2010: 475-476; Enoch 2011: 175; White 2011: 
sec. 4.2; Clarke-Doane 2012; Setiya 2012: 79; Shafer-Landau 2012: 21-23; Berker 2014: 
sec. 8; Vavova 2014: sec. 3.1; Dogramaci 2016]. Take the perceptual case. If, in response 
to some skeptical worry, we want to vindicate our perceptual capacities, we have to allow 
from the start that our perceptual seemings warrant the belief that things are as they seem 
(see Pryor [2000]). More specifically, if we want to avoid an EDA for perceptual realism, 
we need to show how evolution would select truth-tracking perceptual faculties. But of 
course, this requires warrant for the beliefs about evolutionary theory and the relevant 
observations, which of course relies on our perceptual beliefs. It looks like we can 
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permissibly assume some perceptual beliefs in reply to perceptual skepticism. (Similar 
worries hold in the logical, mathematical, and inductive domains.) 
 So the debunker has a very pointed task in front of her: her account must make it 
plausible that first-order replies beg the question, while still allowing a non-question-
begging route to knowledge in any domain where it’s clear that realism is true and we have 
knowledge of the relevant truths. Such an account of ‘question-begging’ need not—and in 
my preferred account will not—be a satisfactory account of the general nature of begging 
the question. It need only entail that first-order replies are overall objectionable without 
overgeneralizing.  
Yet debunkers have failed to give such an account, nor have they tried. While two 
philosophers have offered accounts of begging the question, these accounts are not 
favorable to the debunker. Setiya offers the following sufficient condition for begging the 
question: 
QBS: A reply to some skeptical worry begs the question if it treats a belief 
as evidence of its own truth, or an appearance as evidence for the 
reliability of appearances [2012: 81-82]. 
 
Dogramaci offers a different sufficient condition: 
 
QBD: A reply to some skeptical worry begs the question if (i) the reply 
uses the method under scrutiny to supply the premises that X, that 
Y, and that Z, and (ii) that X & Y & Z entails most of the 
propositions the method leads you to believe [2016: 12].11 
 
                                                 
11 I use the ‘partial formulation’ for simplicity. 
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Setiya argues that first-order replies need not meet the antecedent of QBS, while Dogramaci 
argues that QBD overgeneralizes. So neither account will help the debunker. The debunker 
must come up with a new one. In the next section, that is just what I’ll do. 
SECTION 2: TRUTH SELECTION  
 
If we can give an evolutionary explanation of our perceptual faculties, why aren’t 
our perceptual beliefs debunked? One initially appealing answer is that while our moral 
faculties seem to have been selected only because they are disposed to produce beliefs with 
certain contents, our perceptual faculties seem to have been selected because they are 
disposed to produce true beliefs. Consider: it would be adaptive to believe that we ought 
to take care of our children regardless of whether it actually is wrong. Evolution selected 
faculties that would generate this belief because of its propensity to bring about our 
children’s survival, regardless of whether it is true. On the other hand, in most cases it is 
only adaptive to believe that there is a tiger in front of me if there actually is a tiger in front 
of me. If there weren’t, evolution would be much less likely to produce faculties that would 
generate this belief. It seems as if we can explain why we have reliable perceptual 
faculties—that is, perceptual faculties that reliably produce true perceptual beliefs—in a 
way we can’t for our moral faculties. 
However, in order to avoid over-generalization, our account of what makes a reply 
to skepticism about domain D question-begging should also allow for the reliance on D-
beliefs. So, I propose the following sufficient condition for begging the question: 
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Truth Selection:  A reply to some skeptical worry begs the question if, having 
assumed the substantive claims in question, it at best 
explains why we have the cognitive faculties we have, and 
entails that they are reliable, but does not explain why we 
ended up with some reliable faculties. 
 
(Schechter [2010] presents a similar constraint. See also Faraci [manuscript] and Lutz 
[manuscript].) I will argue that if Truth Selection is true, then an important class of first-
order replies beg the question, without overgeneralizing.  
 Intuitively, first-order replies do not explain why we ended up with some reliable 
faculties. Schafer’s response, for example, boils down to the idea that evolution resulted in 
faculties disposed to produce certain beliefs, and these beliefs are true—there is no more 
substantive connection between their truth and our believing them. And equally intuitively, 
once we assume a small number of perceptual claims, it seems clear that our perceptual 
faculties were selected because they were reliable: it is adaptive to believe a tiger is in front 
of you because there is a tiger in front of you.  
 But these intuitions may seem weak, and at any rate they may be weaker in non-
moral domains aside from the perceptual domain. It will be helpful to get a better sense of 
the epistemic problem involved in not explaining why we ended up with some reliable 
faculties. That’s what I’ll do in the remainder of this section, by trying to find a necessary 
condition on explaining why certain faculties are reliable. Debunkers will need first-order 
replies to fail this necessary condition, while replies in other domains do not.  
 One might be tempted to understand Truth Selection modally. Here are three modal 
claims which might constitute necessary conditions on explaining why we ended up with 
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some reliable faculties. When a reply explains why we ended up with some reliable 
faculties, then for at least most beliefs produced by such faculties, we believe that P and: 
Safety: In the nearest possible worlds in which we believe that P, P is true 
[Sosa 1999; Setiya 2012; Clarke-Doane 2017]. 
 
Adherence: In the nearest possible worlds in which P is true, we believe that P 
[Nozick 1981: 176-177; Setiya 2012]. 
 
Sensitivity: In the nearest possible worlds in which P is false, we do not believe 
that P [Nozick 1981: 172-173; Sosa 1999; Clarke-Doane 2017]. 
 
The debunker needs a condition that both (i) actually constitutes a necessary condition on 
explaining why our faculties are reliable, and (ii) is a condition that first-order replies will 
fail. 
 It’s not at all clear that any of these modal conditions can meet those two criteria. 
Here I’ll give some reasons for worry, with regard to each. My aim is not to show that each 
condition fails to meet both (i) and (ii), but rather to show that these modal conditions are 
at least prima facie worrisome in ways that my approach is not.  
 The root of the worry with Safety and Adherence is the same: that at least our beliefs 
in fundamental moral principles, when true, are necessarily true. Let’s assume the 
following picture, which while simplistic, goes wrong only in harmless ways: principles 
are of the form ∀x(Dx→Mx), where ‘Dx’ is a non-moral predicate and ‘Mx’ is a moral 
one. Some moral principles are fundamental—they do not obtain in virtue of any further 
moral (or normative) facts/truths. These are the best candidates for being necessarily true, 
since any particular moral truth (read this as: ‘non-principle’) will be contingent upon 
(contingent) non-moral truths. 
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 Our beliefs in the fundamental moral principles will be safe and adhere. They will 
be safe trivially, in fact: since they are true in all possible worlds, they are true in the nearest 
worlds where we believe them. They will also adhere: the nearest worlds where a 
necessarily true proposition is true are just the nearest worlds simpliciter. And in those 
worlds, evolution selects for the moral faculties it actually selected for, and we end up 
believing the same moral principles. 
 But most of our moral beliefs are not about fundamental principles. They are about 
whether Hillary is a good person or whether we ought to donate to relief efforts for the 
latest hurricane. These moral beliefs are contingently true: it’s contingent that Hillary has 
the characteristics that make someone a good person, or that the hurricane hits a populated 
area. Are these beliefs safe? Do they adhere? If not, the debunker could argue that Safety 
or Adherence is a necessary condition on explaining why we ended up with some reliable 
faculties, and that our moral beliefs generally fail this condition (even though a small class 
of our beliefs meet it).  
 But I am skeptical that this will work. We’ve already seen that our beliefs in 
fundamental moral beliefs adhere and are safe. We should assume that in general, our non-
moral beliefs (the ones about morally relevant matters, at least) also adhere and are safe. 
(The debunker is not, after all, interested in general skeptical worries about our non-moral 
beliefs.) But if our beliefs about the fundamental principles are safe, and our beliefs about 
the relevant non-moral matters are safe, then we should expect our particular moral beliefs 
to be safe, generally speaking. And the same goes for adherence. 
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 The ‘generally speaking’ there is important: safety is not closed under safe 
entailment, nor is adherence closed under adhering entailment. But consider an example: I 
believe that Hillary is a good person because she exhibits deeply-ingrained character traits 
XYZ. My evidence that she has XYZ is stable—I’ve known her for years, we have lots of 
mutual friends, etc. So in all nearby worlds, I believe Hillary has XYZ. And since my belief 
in the (suppose, fundamental) principle that having XYZ makes someone a good person is 
deeply held, I believe it in all nearby worlds too. Yet it is a far-flung world in which, for 
any relatively simple principle, I believe both the principle and its antecedent but not its 
consequent. So in all nearby worlds, I also believe that Hillary is a good person. Now take 
the nearest worlds in which I believe that Hillary has XYZ—since we’re assuming this 
belief is safe, it follows that in those worlds Hillary actually has XYZ. But since the 
principle is necessarily true, it follows that in those worlds Hillary is actually a good person. 
So my belief that Hillary is a good person is safe. (For further doubts about whether moral 
beliefs are safe, see Joyce [2016].) 
 The same goes for Adherence. Hillary has XYZ in all nearby worlds, which (given 
the necessity of the principle) means that she is a good person in all nearby worlds. But I 
will also believe that she is good in all those worlds, for the same reason as before: I believe 
the antecedent and the conditional in all nearby worlds. So my belief that Hillary is a good 
person also adheres. (For further doubts about whether moral beliefs adhere, see Handfield 
[2016].) 
 Of course this doesn’t show that all or even most of our particular moral beliefs are 
safe, or that they adhere. But I think that the example is a pretty mundane one—many of 
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our particular moral beliefs will be just like this one. It is enough to make us worry that the 
debunker won’t be able to argue that on any given first-order reply, most of our beliefs will 
fail Safety or Adherence.  
 It’s also unclear whether debunkers should appeal to Sensitivity. If there are no 
possible worlds where P is true, then it’s unclear how we even ought to evaluate what is 
the case in the nearest possible worlds where P is false. (For further doubts about whether 
moral beliefs are sensitive, see Joyce [2016].) The debunker might try modifying 
Sensitivity: 
Sensitivity*: In the nearest worlds in which P is false, we do not believe that P.  
 
The modification changes ‘possible worlds’ to ‘worlds’. This allows us to evaluate 
Sensitivity* even where P is necessarily true, since P could be false in impossible worlds.  
 But Sensitivity* is questionable, at least, as a necessary condition on explaining 
why we ended up with some reliable faculties—in which case it won’t help the debunker. 
If Sensitivity* is such a necessary condition, then just in virtue of a first-order reply 
entailing an impossible world where evolution results in false beliefs, it begs the question.  
But strange things are often afoot in impossible worlds, and besides, what happens in a 
world so very distant from our own seems irrelevant to whether we have explained why 
our faculties are reliable in this one.  
 Of course, one might claim that the nearest impossible worlds where the 
fundamental principles are false are worlds just like ours in non-moral respects. After all, 
supervenience only ranges over possible worlds, and fundamental principles at best 
trivially supervene on the non-moral anyway. So maybe what happens in such worlds is 
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relevant to explanations of reliability in this one.12 But whether this is so seems to me at 
best unclear. We should at least be interested in a different necessary condition on 
explaining why we ended up with some reliable faculties—one that avoids the potential 
problems with Sensitivity*.13 
 I suggest that when a reply explains why we ended up with some reliable faculties, 
then for at least most beliefs produced by such faculties, we believe that P and: 
IP: That we believe that P is not probabilistically independent of P. 
Belief that P is probabilistically independent of P where: 
 Pr(We believe that P | P) = Pr(We believe that P). 
In other words, our belief that P is probabilistically independent of the truth of P when the 
truth of P does not change the probability that we believe that P. 
 IP seems right to me. If I explain why we have a certain reliable faculty, then my 
explanation entails that we will be more likely to hold the relevant beliefs if they are true. 
From IP and Truth Selection we can deduce a single sufficient condition for begging the 
question:  
Truth SelectionIP: A reply to some skeptical worry begs the question if, having 
assumed the substantive claims in question, our beliefs 
within the relevant domain are probabilistically independent 
of their truth.   
 
                                                 
12 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry. 
13 None of the problems with the modal conditions will be solved by weakening the necessity involved in 
moral claims, as Rosen [manuscript] proposes. With Safety and Adherence, this won’t affect the nearest 
worlds. And even though Sensitivity can be evaluated now, the worlds in which our beliefs about 
fundamental principles are false will be very distant. 
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I take Truth SelectionIP to be fairly intuitive, but I will not give a direct argument for it 
here. I will show how it explains the intuition that (many) first-order replies are problematic 
(§3) without overgeneralizing (§4). I therefore hope to show that there is a prima facie 
plausible way of understanding the problem with first-order replies that fills the role that 
debunkers need it to (with a caveat to be explained shortly).  
SECTION 3: FIRST-ORDER REPLIES, SCREENING OFF, AND PROBABILISTIC 
INDEPENDENCE  
 
 Much as the debunker wants a criterion that proves all first-order replies 
objectionable, I think that the best he can do is show that only some realists beg the question 
when they employ such replies. Which realists are the culprits? Those who think that moral 
facts (or properties, or truths) cannot influence our moral beliefs. Call this the view that 
moral facts are impotent. I think that the paradigm type of influence here would be causal 
influence, and I will argue that realists who think that moral facts are causally efficacious 
need not violate Truth SelectionIP. While I want to leave open the possibility that moral 
facts have some non-causal type of influence, and that a savvy realist could avoid violating 
Truth SelectionIP by endorsing such influence, I leave it to such a realist to supply a 
satisfactory account of non-causal influence. For all I say here, it may be that the only kind 
of influence moral entities could exert is causal influence; I want to establish only that this 
kind of realism, at least, could avoid begging the question against the Standard EDA.   
 So, let’s first assume that moral facts/properties/truths cannot influence our moral 
beliefs, and see what follows. Consider more closely so-called third-factor replies, such as 
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Enoch’s. Such replies explain our beliefs and their truth in terms of some ‘third factor’. In 
Enoch’s case, this factor is that Φing promotes survival.14 On our substantive moral 
assumption, this (normatively or metaphysically) explains why Φing is good.15 But due to 
evolutionary pressures, that Φing promotes survival also (causally) explains why we 












Figure 1: Enoch’s Third-Factor View 
 
                                                 
14 Enoch never explicitly endorses the specific structure I propose. Yet I take this interpretation as the right 
one, since he tasks himself with explaining the correlation between our beliefs and their truth, later 
claiming that some correlations between A and B are explained by a third factor, C, that is ‘responsible’ for 
both A and B [2011: 169]. Our beliefs and their truth are thus the correlated factors, each explained by a 
common explanans. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.) 
15 There is a debate about whether, when a normative fact holds in virtue of a non-normative one, the non-










Enoch’s moral assumption gets him the right-hand link, while the debunker’s claims about 
evolution—which he grants for the sake of argument—get him the left-hand link. 
 Consider next Wielenberg’s [2010] third-factor view: we typically believe that we 
have certain moral rights. It’s easy to see why: believing that we have a right to life, for 
example, will make us more likely to resist being killed, thus more likely to reproduce. 
But, Wielenberg says, assume that whenever we have certain cognitive capacities, we 
actually do have certain rights. Then we see that our rights coincide with our beliefs that 
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Again, the evolutionary story gets us the lefthand link, while the substantive moral 
assumption gets us the righthand link. 
 I want to argue that third-factor views are thus structurally similar to common cause 
explanations—cases in which two effects are correlated because they share a common 
cause. This similarity—in particular, that both types of explanation involve a third factor 
‘screening off’ one downstream event from the other—helps explain why on third-factor 
replies, our beliefs are probabilistically independent of their truth.  
 Consider an example of a common cause explanation. Suppose that, on a particular 
evening in the U.S., there is a correlation between the number of toilet flushes between 
7:00 and 7:30 and the number of pizzas ordered between 7:00 and 7:30. There is no direct 
causal connection between the two. Instead, they have a common cause: lots of people who 
are watching the Super Bowl are taking advantage of half-time. Assume also (for 
simplicity) that its being halftime at the Super Bowl gives us the full causal explanation of 





















Figure 3: Halftime as the Common Cause 
 
And when this occurs, and there are no independent causal influences on either effect, the 
cause screens off one effect from the other.  
 Let ‘T’ represent ‘Toilet flushes spike’, ‘P’ represent ‘Pizza orders spike’, and ‘H’ 
represent ‘It is halftime at the Super Bowl’. H screens off T from P just in case: 
a. Pr(T | P) ≠ Pr(T) 
b. Pr(T | P&H) = Pr(T|H) 
Before taking H into account, the truth of P increases the probability that T will be true. 
We have stipulated that they are correlated, after all. However, P only increases the 
probability of T because of H—so, once we assume H, P no longer affects the probability 
It is halftime 








of T. It follows from (b) that once we assume H, then T and P are probabilistically 
independent.  
 Third-factor replies share the same structure as common cause explanations, except 
that one of the explanations (the right-hand one in my diagrams) is normative or 
metaphysical, rather than causal. But this does not affect the fact that, once we’ve assumed 
our moral principle, we get another case of screening off.  
 We haven’t established yet that there are no other influences on either our believing 
that Φing is good or Φing actually being good. But this is actually written into the 
stipulations in place at this point in the dialectic: (i) There are no other influences on Φing’s 
goodness besides Φing’s survival promotion. Enoch (and other third-factor proponents) 
want to only assume one moral truth: in this case, that if Φing promotes survival, then it is 
good. So there will be no other normative/metaphysical influences on Φing’s being good. 
(ii) There are no other influences on our believing that Φing is good. We are currently 
granting the debunker the premise that there are no influences on our moral beliefs that will 
make us any likelier to land on the truth (see Street [2006: 124]).  (iii) The two ‘effects’ 
won’t influence each other. By stipulation, Φing’s goodness won’t influence our belief that 
Φing is good. And assuming realism more broadly, our belief that Φing is good won’t 
influence the fact that it is good (such facts are independent of belief). So the parallels with 
common cause explanations lead us to expect that survival promotion will screen off our 
having moral beliefs from the truth of those beliefs.  
 But maybe it’s best to look more closely at the probabilities, anyway. We need to 
establish two things: 
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a. Pr(We believe that Φing is good) ≠ Pr(We believe that Φing is good | Φing is good) 
 
b. Pr(We believe that Φing is good | Φing is good & Φing promotes survival) = Pr(We believe 
that Φing is good | Φing promotes survival) 
 
It seems that (a) is true, since we know (given our assumptions) that our belief and its truth 
are correlated. However, this correlation only obtains because of the common explanation 
of our belief and its truth: survival promotion. So in Enoch’s case, once we assume that 
Φing promotes survival, our believing that Φing is good and our believing it conditional 
on Φing’s goodness are equally probable. Similarly for Wielenberg: once we assume that 
we have capacities C, our believing that we have right R is just as probable as our believing 
it conditional on our actually having R.  
 Here’s the payoff: once we assume the moral principle (the right-hand link), and 
we know that the third factor obtains—which third-factor responses assume—our belief is 
probabilistically independent of its truth. Taking Enoch as an example, we conclude: 
 Pr(We believe that Φing is good | Φing is good) = Pr(We believe that Φing is good). 
 
So, on Truth SelectionIP, third-factor responses beg the question against the Standard EDA.  
 The simpler first-order replies (like Schafer’s above) also entail that our holding 
our moral beliefs is probabilistically independent of those beliefs’ truth. This is at its 
starkest perhaps in Dworkin’s [1996: 125] response to a different skeptical objection: ‘But 
why shouldn't you count it as a piece of luck—a special example of what Bernard Williams 
has called moral luck—that your self-interest and justice here coincide?’ I think such 
replies are best construed as assuming the truth of our moral beliefs in general—as opposed 
to third-factor replies, which assume that just one moral belief is true. They thus have no 
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need of the subtle machinery third-factor replies employ. Take for example our beliefs that 












Figure 4: Simple First-Order Replies 
 
Instead of positing a principle, like Enoch, that gets them a common explanation of 
goodness and our beliefs about it, these simpler first-order replies go straight to the 
punchline, assuming our moral beliefs in general are true. The proponent of this sort of 
first-order reply can simply say: ‘Φing is good. Oh, and what luck! Evolution has also led 
us to believe that Φing is good.’ 
 It’s not hard to see why, if moral facts are impotent, this sort of reply violates Truth 










beliefs. And there is no common explanation to our beliefs and their truth. Without either 
kind of connection, there’s simply no way for the truth of our beliefs to make it more 
probable that we have those beliefs. So these simpler first-order replies also beg the 
question against the Standard EDA.  
 So far, I’ve assumed the general impotence of moral facts, in order to show that if 
Truth SelectionIP is true, then realists who accept such impotence beg the question against 
the debunker when they make first-order replies. But what about realists who deny the 
general impotence of moral facts? I want to consider just one kind of view here, arguing 
that realists who think that moral facts are causally efficacious need not beg the question 
when giving first-order replies. I will call this view naturalism. (Whether my definition of 
‘naturalism’ captures all the naturalisms in the literature is another question—here, let it 
merely be a stipulative definition.16) 
 I think that it’s pretty clear: naturalists need not beg the question when they make 
first-order replies to the debunker. This is because, whether the naturalist appeals to some 
third-factor response or the simpler first-order reply, her naturalism allows her to posit a 
causal link between the moral facts and our beliefs about them. So, her (simple) first-order 
reply allows for this structure: 
 
                                                 
16 For some popular definitions of ‘naturalism’, see Parfit [2011: 464] and Enoch [2011: 1]. I think my 
definition makes sense of these definitions, but see Oddie [2005], Cuneo [2007], and Majors [2007] for 
discussion of some purportedly non-naturalistic views that endorse the causal efficacy of moral facts. So-
called non-reductive naturalists present a further wrinkle—see Brink [1989] and Sturgeon [2006]. Taking 
Brink’s view as an example, it’s unclear whether, if moral facts are fully constituted by but not identical to 













Figure 5: Enoch’s Third-Factor View On Naturalism 
 
And of course, when we introduce the assumption that Φing is good the probability that 
we believe as much will go up, so long as Φing’s promoting survival doesn’t make it 
certain that we believe that Φing is good.17 So on Truth SelectionIP, naturalists do not beg 
the question when they employ first-order replies. 
SECTION 4: TRUTH SELECTIONIP DOES NOT OVERGENERALIZE  
 
                                                 
17 As a referee points out, this may require slightly backing off the claim that natural selection fully 











 Now consider replies to perceptual debunking arguments that rely on the truth of 
some perceptual claims. We need to assume, the story goes, that the observations that 
confirm evolutionary theory were reliable in order to argue that evolution selects for true 
perceptual beliefs. But on Truth SelectionIP, that’s fine: the perceptual realist has not yet 
begged the question. Once we assume the reliability of those observations, though, does it 
become plausible that our perceptual beliefs were selected for their truth? Or in other 
words, does the truth of the belief that there is a tiger (or a table, or a tangerine) in front of 
me make it more probable that I will believe as much, given evolutionary influence on 
these beliefs? The answer seems to be an obvious ‘yes’. If it is true that there is a tiger in 
front of me, it is adaptive for me to believe it. Believing that there is a tiger in front of me 
makes it far more likely that I’ll run (or fight!). And if there really is a tiger in front of me, 
then running or fighting greatly increases my odds of  
survival. And of course, because evolution selects for such adaptive traits, if there really is 
a tiger in front of me, I’m more likely to believe it.  
 Consider next the inductive domain. Again, we may need to assume the reliability 
of our inductive faculties in replying to inductive skepticism (see Dogramaci [2016]). But 
once we do so, our inductive beliefs are not probabilistically independent of their truth. 
Consider one of my distant ancestors: he has watched this trail every day for three months. 
On every third day, at roughly the same time of the day each time, a rabbit runs along the 
same portion of the trail. Will my ancestor be more likely to survive if he believes that on 
the third day, the rabbit will run along the trail? He will if inductive inferences are reliable. 
In that case, the rabbit will predictably run the trail, and if my ancestor believes it, he’ll be 
 56 
more likely to snare him. And of course, snaring the rabbit increases our ancestor’s odds 
of survival, which in turn increases the odds of our making reliable inductive inferences.  
 There is a problem when we turn to the domains of logic and mathematics. The 
problem, stated simply, is that truths about mathematics and logic—traditionally 
understood—are necessarily true.18 Yet whenever P is a necessary truth, our belief that P 
will be probabilistically independent of its truth. To see why, consider a short proof. The 
following are either core Bayesian rules or consequences of those rules (see Titelbaum 
[manuscript]): 
 The Ratio Formula: Pr(P | Q) = Pr(P&Q) / Pr(Q) 
 General Additivity: Pr(P&Q) = Pr(P) + Pr(Q) – Pr(P v Q) 
 Entailment:  If X entails Y, then Pr(X) ≤ Pr(Y) 
 Maximality:  For any proposition P, Pr(P) ≤ 1  
 
Now suppose that Pr(Q) = 1 (i.e. Q is necessary). It follows from Entailment and 
Maximality that Pr(P v Q) = 1. But given General Additivity, that means that Pr(P&Q) = 
Pr(P).  And when we plug that into the Ratio Formula, we get Pr(P | Q) = Pr(P) / Pr(Q). 
Since Pr(Q) = 1, by stipulation, Pr(P | Q) = Pr (P). This has been called the Problem of Old 
Evidence (see Strevens [manuscript: ch. 11]). 
 What follows is that, if the debunker accepts my account, she is committed to each 
of the following: 
i. Either logical realism is false or we have no logical knowledge. 
ii. Either mathematical realism is false or we have no mathematical knowledge.  
                                                 
18 For the objection to work, we have to understand mathematical truths such that they do not include truths 
like ‘There are more than 10 words in this paper’—and similarly for logic.  
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If evolutionary influence is worrisome for moral realists, then it is worrisome for logical 
and mathematical realists. 
 It’s important to see that this is not the problem I have been pressing or see as the 
heart of the issue in the moral domain. I have argued that on first-order replies, our moral 
beliefs are probabilistically independent of their truth. But this is not because such beliefs 
are necessarily true. In fact, many moral beliefs are only contingently true, as I note above. 
This stands in stark contrast with the mathematical and logical domains, where all truths 
are necessarily true. So while in morality, mathematics, and logic, our beliefs will be 
probabilistically independent of their truth, it’s only in the latter two cases that this is 
because the relevant truths are all necessary. In other words, on first-order replies, our 
moral beliefs will be probabilistically independent of their truth, but not trivially so.   
 So while, on first-order replies, our moral beliefs are non-trivially probabilistically 
independent of their truth, our mathematical and logical beliefs are trivially 
probabilistically independent of their truth. This still leaves open the question of whether 
this latter fact is problematic for the debunker, and if so what he can say about it. I think 
that it is not problematic at all, and I’ll now argue for this.  
 When a first-order reply to D-skepticism entails that our D-beliefs are trivially 
probabilistically independent of their truth, that reply is either objectionable or it isn’t. 
Suppose first that it isn’t. It’s only objectionable, that is, when that reply entails that our 
D-beliefs are non-trivially probabilistically independent of their truth. The debunker would 
need to narrow Truth SelectionIP to reflect this: 
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Modified Truth SelectionIP: A reply to some skeptical worry begs the question if, 
having assumed the substantive claims in question, 
our beliefs within the relevant domain are non-
trivially probabilistically independent of their truth.   
 
In this case, the debunker can actually save non-skeptical logical/mathematical realism, 
while debunking moral realism. And while that’s a very interesting—and to many, 
desirable—result, it is not obviously a problem for the debunker. 
 Suppose next that a first-order reply is objectionable when it entails that our D-
beliefs are trivially probabilistically independent of their truth. The debunker will thus be 
committed to (i) and (ii), above. We really shouldn’t be terribly surprised by this result: 
philosophers have argued that debunkers are committed to the package view already: 
Clarke-Doane [2012] argues that if moral realism gets debunked, then so does 
mathematical realism. Schecter [2010: 437] assumes that the ‘reliability challenge’—in 
many respects closely related to debunking arguments—is at least prima facie a problem 
for ‘mathematics, modality, morality, and other a priori domains’. Bengson [2015] claims 
there is a prima facie problem for any realm concerning non-spatiotemporal, causally inert 
entities (see also Faraci [manuscript]). That debunkers are committed to isomorphic 
arguments against logical and mathematical realism is thus exactly what many expected to 
happen. 
 The debunker should not be worried by this, for two reasons. First, the Problem of 
Old Evidence is a problem for Bayesianism in general. The debunker, therefore, should not 
be especially worried about it. To be sure, she should be worried insofar as she is a 
Bayesian—which my account here commits her to—but Bayesians abound these days, and 
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we should not throw out my account just because a very broadly plausible approach that it 
depends on has a problem. And besides, when/if Bayesians solve the Problem of Old 
Evidence, the solution might offer debunkers some interesting way to introduce 
probabilistic dependence relations to mathematical and logical truths. 
 Second, however, even if there is no solution to the Problem of Old Evidence, the 
generalization to mathematics and logic is not the type of generalization that the critics of 
the Standard EDA are (or should be) worried about. Those who are worried that the 
question-begging charge will overgeneralize are almost exclusively worried about the 
perceptual domain: they worry that the Standard EDA is going to entail that if truths like 
‘there is a tree in front of me’ are mind-independent, then we can’t have knowledge 
regarding them [Schafer 2010; Enoch 2011: 158ff; Shafer-Landau 2012; Berker 2014; 
Vavova 2014]. If the debunker must claim either that such truths are really mind-
dependent, or that we can’t know anything about them, that’s a huge cost for her argument. 
Similarly for inductive truths: if the debunker is committed either to the mind-dependence 
of truths about whether the sun will rise tomorrow, or that we can never know such things, 
that seems like a death-knell for the Standard EDA (see Dogramaci [2016]). But the 
Problem of Old Evidence doesn’t have any bearing on the perceptual and inductive 
domains: truths in those domains are typically contingent. So in summary, what turns on 
this question—of whether it’s problematic for a reply to entail trivial probabilistic 
independence—is just whether the debunker is committed to one or the other interesting, 
but not obviously problematic view. 
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 Suppose everything I’ve said is true: that those who deny that moral facts can 
influence our beliefs cannot permissibly utilize first-order replies to the Standard EDA, but 
that (at least) naturalists can. It does not immediately follow that the former class of realists 
cannot give a plausible reply to the Standard EDA: it might be that, as FitzPatrick [2015] 
has argued, there are independent problems with debunking arguments. It is beyond the 
ken of this paper to decide whether this is true. We ought to conclude that if there are no 
independent problems with the Standard EDA, then it is successful against many realists, 
but not naturalists.  
CONCLUSION  
 
 First-order replies seem from one angle intuitive, from another philosophical 
prestidigitation. I’ve argued that there is one understanding of the problem with such 
replies that fills debunkers’ dialectical needs: it entails that an important class of realists—
those who endorse the impotency of moral facts—cannot make use of first-order replies, 
and it does so without objectionably overgeneralizing. If moral facts cannot influence our 
beliefs, then the truth of our moral beliefs does nothing to increase the probability that we’ll 
have those beliefs. Realists who accept this thus beg the question when employing first-
order replies. This account may or may not debunk mathematical and logical realism, but 
I’ve argued that whether this is so doesn’t affect the plausibility of the Standard EDA. 
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Chapter 3: Can Theists Avoid Epistemological Objections to Moral 






 Many epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails moral 
skepticism. While it’s unclear whether such objections work against non-theistic moral 
realists, many philosophers seem to think that theistic realists have an obvious escape route: 
if God exists, there is clearly no epistemological obstacle to moral realism. Yet because 
this is taken as so obvious, such suggestions are crucially underdeveloped. In this paper, I 
have two main purposes. First, I want to show that things are not so simple. There is a good 
case to be made that any plausible theistic reply to these objections begs the question, by 
relying on a substantive moral claim when our knowledge of such is precisely what is in 
question. My second purpose is to show how the theist can plausibly answer this challenge: 
she can argue that God brought about our moral knowledge without relying on any 
substantive moral claims of the kind targeted by such objections. And what’s more, this 
answer also works in reply to epistemological objections to normative realism, more 
broadly: it doesn’t rely on the kind of normative belief targeted by such objections.  I 
conclude that while the theist does have a distinctive reply to epistemological objections, 
it is both far from obvious and very different from what many assume it would look like.  
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 In §1, I lay out several different epistemological objections to moral realism, before 
outlining one in more detail—an evolutionary debunking argument—so that I might rely 
on it as a test case. In §2, I review several philosophers’ claims that theistic moral realism 
enjoys immunity from such epistemological objections. I then outline what I think is a 
natural case to be made for these claims. Then, in §3, I show why this “natural reply” won’t 
work: it violates the requirement (which I defend) that replies to the evolutionary 
debunking argument not rely on a substantive moral claim. In §4 I issue a challenge for the 
theistic moral realist: she must argue that God has most non-moral reason to bring about 
our moral knowledge. In §5, I show two ways in which the theist might meet this challenge. 
Finally, in §6 I argue that the second of these two responses also works in reply to 
epistemological objections to normative realism, more broadly. 
SECTION 1: EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM  
 
Moral realism is the thesis that (i) sincere moral judgments express beliefs, (ii) some 
of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of some moral beliefs does not constitutively 
depend on the attitude of any actual or hypothetical agent.19 Many epistemological 
objections to moral realism have it that realism entails moral skepticism. Yet different 
objections have it that this entailment holds because of different constraints on 
knowledge—constraints that, if realism were true, we purportedly could not meet. In this 
section, I’ll briefly summarize a number of these general epistemological objections to 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Shafer-Landau (2012): 1; Enoch (2011): 3-4. 
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moral realism, before going on to develop one at greater length. This last argument will be 
a test case for many of the claims I make about theistic moral realism in this paper; at the 
end of the paper, I’ll try to generalize my conclusions about this one argument to all of the 
epistemological objections.  
Some think that to know something, we must believe it by means of a non-
accidentally reliable method, and that moral realism fails this constraint:20 
No Accident 
4. To know that P, S must believe that P by means of a non-accidentally reliable method. 
5. If moral realism is true, then no agent believes any substantive moral claim by means of a 
non-accidentally reliable method. 
6. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge. 
 
By “substantive moral knowledge,” I mean knowledge of a substantive moral claim.21 
What makes a moral claim substantive is hard to say: “Discrimination on the basis of race 
is bad” is substantive; “Either Bob’s discrimination was bad or it’s not the case that it was 
bad” is not. We don’t need a precise definition: debunkers are targeting knowledge of 
claims like the first example, but not the second.  
Many others worry that if realism is true, it would be an unexplained coincidence 
if our moral faculties were reliable:22 
No Coincidence 
7. To know that P, it must not be an unexplained coincidence that the faculties that produce 
S’s belief that P are reliable. 
8. If moral realism is true, then it would be an unexplained coincidence if any agent’s moral 
faculties (at least those that produce substantive moral beliefs) were reliable.  
9. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge. 
                                                 
20 See Setiya (2012): ch 3. For non-accidentality as a general constraint on knowledge, see Unger (1968).  
21 The “substantive” qualifier isn’t always included, but should be. No matter the nature of moral facts, we 
could have knowledge of analytic moral claims. 
22 Street (2006) and (2008). See also Bedke (2009), Shafer-Landau (2012), and Parfit (2011): 492-497. 
Finally, for presentation of a similar argument, see Enoch (2011): ch. 7 (esp. 7.2).  
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 Two other objections to moral realism can be grouped together. According to the 
first, if realism is true, then in the nearest possible worlds in which our moral beliefs are 
false, we still have those beliefs—i.e., they are insensitive:23  
 Sensitivity 
10. If for some belief that P, S believes that P in the nearest possible worlds in which not-P, 
then S does not know that P. 
11. If moral realism is true, then all agents would have the substantive moral beliefs they 
actually do in the nearest possible worlds in which those beliefs are false.  
12. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge. 
 
According to another objection, moral realism entails that in most of the near-by possible 
worlds in which we have the moral beliefs we do, our moral beliefs are false—i.e., they are 
unsafe:24 
 Safety 
13. If for some belief that P, P is false in most of the near-by possible worlds in which S 
believes that P, then S does not know that P.  
14. If moral realism is true, then all agents’ substantive moral beliefs are false in most of the 
near-by possible worlds in which they have those beliefs. 
15. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge. 
 
There will be further details and problems for each of these four arguments, but such will 
be irrelevant here. 
 One might wonder what it is particularly about realism that generates these worries. 
That is, why does realism make it the case that (for example) no agent believes any 
substantive moral claim by means of a non-accidentally reliable method, and so on for the 
other constraints on knowledge? There is no helpful answer available at this point in the 
                                                 
23 Bedke (2009), Clarke-Doane (2012), and Kahane (2011). See also Joyce (2001): 163-165; Street (2006): 
125-126, and especially endnote 26. For a very similar way of formulating sensitivity (and safety), see, e.g., 
Pritchard (forthcoming).  
24 See Ruse and Wilson (1985), Joyce (2007): 181, Street (2006): 120-121, and even Darwin himself 
(1871/1998): 102. See also Bogardus (2016).  
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dialectic, since the second premise of each argument could be supported in a number of 
different ways. However, it will be helpful to see one important way these premises have 
recently been supported. To this I now turn.  
Though they are inherently more general in scope, most of these objections have 
recently been made in a very particular form. That is, each has it that if realism is true, then 
our moral beliefs fail some particular necessary condition on knowledge. But many 
philosophers have argued that it is the influence of evolution on our moral beliefs that 
results in the failure of that necessary condition.25 For most of the rest of my paper, I deal 
exclusively with such evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). I do this primarily just 
in order to have a single test case. But EDAs are an especially good test case for claims 
about the more general objections, since for any of those objections, there is an EDA that 
is a particular version of it. §5 will focus on taking the conclusions I draw from the test 
case and generalizing them to apply also to the above objections. For these reasons, let us 
turn now to consider what I call the Standard EDA: 
The Standard EDA 
16. Epistemological Premise: If (a) moral realism is true, (b) evolution has strongly influenced 
our moral faculties in such a way that those faculties are disposed to produce beliefs with 
certain propositional contents over others, and (c) there is no independent confirmation 
of the reliability of those faculties, then we have no substantive moral knowledge. 
17. Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our moral faculties in such a way 
that those faculties are disposed to produce beliefs with certain propositional contents 
over others. 
18. Autonomy: There is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties. 
19. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no substantive moral knowledge.26 
 
                                                 
25 See Street (2006); Gibbard (2003): ch. 13; and Joyce (2007). See also Horn (forthcoming), Greene 
(2008), Kitcher (2007), and Ruse and Wilson (1986). 
26 This argument is meant to capture what is common to the EDAs cited in footnote 9 in the most charitable 
way possible.  
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Let’s briefly look at the premises in more detail.  
Premise (14) is not my concern here, since theism generally does nothing to aid a 
denial of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties.27 Perhaps theists have a special 
purchase on denials of evolution altogether—but I will make my task easier by only 
considering types of theism which are compatible with evolutionary biology. Premise (15) 
will end up being the theist’s target. But before moving on to see whether she can hit that 
target, let’s get a quick look at how the standard debunker could support (13).  
 It is (13) where the four general epistemological objections above come into play. 
As one example, consider:   
 SensitivityEDA 
20. If (a-c) hold, then we would still have our moral beliefs in the nearest possible worlds in 
which they are false. 
21. If we would believe that P in the nearest possible worlds in which P is false, then we do 
not know that P. 
22. Therefore, if (a-c) hold, then we have no substantive moral knowledge.  
 
(18) simply represents the general constraint on knowledge mentioned originally in 
premise (7) of Sensitivity. The other constraints could (and have) played similar roles in 
defense of (13).  
 But what about (17)? What is it about realism that generates the worry that our 
moral beliefs are insensitive (when assuming evolutionary pressure and no independent 
confirmation)? Roughly, the worry is that my belief that I ought to take care of my children 
is adaptive regardless of whether it is true: believing it makes us more likely to pass on out 
                                                 
27 Critics of (14) include Shafer-Landau (2012): 5-8; Fitzpatrick (2014): 241-246.; Parfit (2011): 534-538; 
Huemer (2008); James (2011): 79-81; Copp (2008): 194; Street (2006): 155. Such replies, while theism-
compatible, are not uniquely theistic. 
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genetic material even if it is false. (Compare to the perceptual case: it is usually only 
adaptive to believe that there is a tiger nearby if there actually is.) Thus, in the nearest 
worlds in which this claim is false, we still believe it.  
 Anti-realists don’t face the same fate. Take the (toy) anti-realist view that an act is 
wrong iff—and wholly because—I believe that it is wrong. On this view, supposing that it 
is true that I ought to take care of my children, this is only true because I believe that it is 
true. Where it is false, I do not believe that it is true—as a direct result of the theory. So, in 
the nearest worlds in which it is false, I do not believe it.   
 There is a version of the Standard EDA that relies on each of the constraints on 
knowledge above, but I need not spell them out here. My point here is simply to show how 
the Standard EDA can be a vehicle for a variety of different epistemological objections, 
and to set the stage for an explanation of how theists might reply to the Standard EDA.  In 
extremely general terms, on the Standard EDA, realists supposedly run afoul of each 
constraint because they think that the moral facts “float free” of our moral beliefs, whereas 
anti-realists think that there is a close dependence of the facts on our beliefs, allowing them 
to say that such beliefs are non-coincidentally true, or formed on the basis of a non-
accidentally reliable method, etc.  
SECTION 2: THE NATURAL THEISTIC REPLY TO THE STANDARD EDA  
 
Many philosophers seem to think that, while the Standard EDA is at the very least 
prima facie problematic for the realist, it is clearly not problematic for the theistic moral 
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realist.28 In most cases, this seems to be so clear to such philosophers that they relegate the 
point to a short paragraph, if not a footnote. Thus, Kahane: 
If we were the designed products of God, then it does seem rational for us to rely on our 
natural doxastic dispositions given that these were implanted in us by an omniscient and 
omnibenevolent being.29 
 
Bedke similarly claims: 
Given this [our moral beliefs’ causal history], it would be a great cosmic coincidence if the 
causal order were orchestrated just perfectly, so as to produce intuitions and beliefs that 
accurately reflect the ethical facts. We would need something like a god rigging the ethical 
facts and the causal order so as to ensure their serendipitous coincidence.30 
 
The idea, I think, being that if we had evidence of such a god, the evolutionary objection 
from “cosmic coincidence”—in Bedke’s terms—would disappear.  
 There are also those who claim that theism can easily solve a general 
epistemological objection. Parfit considers an argument from massive coincidence that is 
independent of evolutionary considerations and claims that: 
God might have designed our brains so that, without such causal contact [with 
mathematical facts], we can reason in ways that lead us to reach true answers to 
mathematical questions. We might have similar God-given abilities to respond to reasons, 
and to form true beliefs about these reasons.31 
 
And likewise, in discussing the argument from non-accidental reliability mentioned above, 
Setiya claims that: 
Things look different if we turn to God. Assuming God can know the truth in ethics, even 
if it is irreducible, he may create in us, or some of us, reliable dispositions. On this account, 
ethical principles can explain how we are disposed to form true beliefs [thus meeting the 
                                                 
28 Besides those below, see Wielenberg (2010): 460; Bogardus (2016): 7, 12-13; Crow (2015): 10-11; and 
Fitpatrick (2014): 250. 
29 Kahane (2011): 109. See also fn. 16, which acknowledges further complexities.  
30 Bedke (2009): 109. 
31 Parfit (2011): 493. 
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non-accidental reliability constraint]. This is, I think, the only hope for ethical knowledge 
if the facts are constitutively independent of us.32 
 
So according to Setiya, not only can theism solve a major epistemological problem for 
realism, but it alone can.  
 However, things are not so easy for the theist as such philosophers have made them 
look. In fact, what’s lacking from all of these philosophers’ work is any real description of 
how the theistic response to the Standard EDA is supposed to work. In the rest of this 
section, I hope to give a plausible model for how a theistic reply to the Standard EDA 
would proceed. Only then can I point out the obstacles to such a reply. 
 First we should get clear on the goal of theistic replies to the Standard EDA. Some 
of the quoted theistic replies above may be read as arguing that it possible that realism is 
true and we have moral knowledge. It is tempting to read them, that is, as arguing: 
a. The evolutionary debunking argument fails in general, because it is possible that theism is true, 
and on theism, it’s possible that moral realism is true and we have substantive moral 
knowledge.  
 
(a) takes the task of debunking arguments to be to show the impossibility of moral 
knowledge. But this doesn’t make sense of why such authors go on to present their own 
non-theistic proposals—why would they, if they had already defeated the Standard EDA?  
My construal of debunking arguments makes sense of such reasoning: the Standard 
EDA is an argument that we don’t have moral knowledge on realism, not that we can’t. 
(Nor does it proceed to the former by way of the latter: surely the Empirical Premise is, if 
true, only contingently true.) So the theist needs to do more than show the compossibility 
                                                 
32 Setiya (2012): 114. 
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of (i) God exists, (ii) moral realism is true, and (iii) we have substantive moral knowledge. 
Yet she need not show that (iii) deductively follows from (i) and (ii), since she is only trying 
to rebut an argument that (ii) and (iii) don’t co-obtain. So the theist’s task is to show, 
instead: 
b. The Standard EDA fails for theists, because on the assumption of theism, it’s plausible—not 
merely possible—that if moral realism is true, then we have substantive moral knowledge.  
 
This means that, with a very important exception to be noted shortly, the theist is free to 
rely on any claim that is plausible on the assumption of theism, to show that assuming (i) 
and (ii) makes (iii) plausible. 
So, here’s one example of how the theist could reply to the Standard EDA. Call it 
“the Natural Reply.” God, if he exists, is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. 
Because he is omnipotent and omniscient, he has the ability to either (a) start the causal 
order in such a way that evolution results in human beings who have moral knowledge or 
(b) monitor the evolutionary process and intervene in the causal order to “tweak” that 
process if he foresees that it will lead to humans who don’t have moral knowledge.33 The 
latter would be a form of “special divine action”, which is assumed by some to be more 
problematic than other forms of God’s action such as creating and sustaining the world.34 
I will employ no such assumption here (see Plantinga (2011: chs. 3 & 4) for an argument 
that it is false), but at any rate, if special divine action is especially problematic, (a) is still 
open for the theist. 
                                                 
33 See Sober (2010) and Sober (2014) for an argument that it is compatible with evolutionary theory that 
God guided certain mutations.  
34 See Plantiga (2011): ch. 3. 
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To see how this would work in more detail, assume that the standard debunker 
supports (13)—the Epistemological Premise—via SensitivityEDA. In either (a) or (b), we 
would end up with sensitive moral beliefs: in the nearest possible worlds in which our 
actual moral beliefs are false, God brings it about that we don’t have them. (Of course, he 
could do (b) while also doing something akin to (a)—i.e., starting the causal order in such 
a way that, with the fewest possible “tweaks” on his part, it will result in humans with true 
moral beliefs.) And—very importantly—because God is morally perfect, he will do either 
(a) or (b). This is because a morally perfect being wants his creatures to be good, and 
goodness (at least for humans) requires moral knowledge.35 
SECTION 3: WHY THE NATURAL REPLY WON’T WORK  
 
In this section I will argue that the Natural Reply fails. That argument relies on a 
controversial constraint on replies to the Standard EDA. I give an argument for that 
constraint but, in the end, I assume its truth for the sake of argument: if it is false, replies 
are incredibly cheap, and all realists—theists and non-theists—are in the clear.  
The Natural Reply relies on the following claims: (i) a morally perfect being would 
want his creatures to be morally good, and (ii) moral goodness (at least for humans) 
requires moral knowledge (and hence, e.g., sensitive moral beliefs). Each of these is 
plausibly a substantive moral claim; surely at least one is. But recall that the Standard EDA 
                                                 
35 The Natural Reply might be thought problematic independently of its use as a reply to the Standard 
EDA. But such objections are not my concern here.  
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attempts to give decisive reason to think that it is precisely substantive moral claims that 
we can’t know to be true. Surely we are unjustified in relying on a premise P in an 
explanation if we have decisive reason to think that we don’t know that P. (Imagine telling 
your friend that he shouldn’t eat meat because it results in harm to animals, but that you 
don’t know that it results in harm to animals!) So, by relying on (i) and (ii) in her reply to 
the Standard EDA, the theist assumes that she does not have decisive reason to think that 
she doesn’t know that those claims are true. But this is just to assume that the Standard 
EDA fails, in the course of an argument that attempts to show that the Standard EDA fails.  
The problem is going to be hard to get away from, for the theist. He could easily 
fill in the details of his story differently: perhaps God wants us to have moral knowledge 
because a morally perfect being would want to maximize utility, and the best way for 
humans to maximize utility is by their having moral knowledge. (Again, there may be 
independent problems here.) But it’s easy to see that this variation also relies on a 
substantive moral claim, and will for that reason also beg the question against 
epistemological objections. Because the problem is so general, we can formulate it as a 
condition on any theistic reply to the epistemological objections in question: 
No Moral Claims: A reply to an epistemological objection to moral realism 
cannot rely on a substantive moral premise. 
 
(I will soon argue that No Moral Claims ought to be narrower, but this is the constraint as 
it is suggested in the literature.)  
Let’s say that a reply to an epistemological objection relies on a premise just when 
the content of that premise is part of the explanation of why we have moral knowledge. 
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Importantly, a reply doesn’t rely on a premise (in this restricted sense) when it merely 
enables the explanation of our moral knowledge.36 That I desired a Dr. Pepper might be 
part of the explanation of why I walked to the 7-Eleven. Yet, though I wouldn’t have 
walked to the 7-Eleven had I desired much more strongly to stay home, that I didn’t desire 
more strongly to stay home is not part of the explanation of my walking to 7-Eleven. It 
merely enables the explanation. In my sense then, the explanation of my walking to the 7-
Eleven relies on the claim that I desired a Dr. Pepper, but not on the claim that I didn’t 
desire more strongly to stay at home. 
A brief word on the necessity of the distinction: lots of things are relevant, in some 
broad sense, to an explanation. It is in this broad sense that both my desire for Dr. Pepper 
and my lack of over-riding desire are relevant to my walking to the 7-Eleven. And it is in 
the same sense that it’s relevant that I’m not asleep, and that I’m generally physically able 
to pursue the objects of my desires. But we don’t want all of these things entering into the 
explanans—otherwise the explanans will be infinitely large! After all, there are infinitely 
many desires that I don’t have, but that (if I did have them) would over-ride my present 
desire for a Dr. Pepper. So we need some way of distinguishing those things that are 
relevant to the explanation, but which aren’t themselves part of the explanans. And what 
seems to unite such things is that, either by their presence or absence, they allow the 
explanation to occur. 
                                                 
36 See Dancy (2004): ch. 3. 
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There is a hardy debate about whether No Moral Claims is true. Many argue that it 
is.37 Many others argue that it is not, since in order to reply to skepticism in other 
domains—e.g., the perceptual—we must rely on substantive claims within that domain.38 
I cannot settle the dispute here. I think No Moral Claims is plausible enough. But more 
importantly, the question I’m concerned with here—whether theism is immune to 
epistemological objections to realism—is really only interesting on the assumption of No 
Moral Claims. If we can rely on substantive moral claims in replying to the Standard EDA, 
then replies are fairly cheap.39 David Enoch—and other proponents of “third-factor replies”—have 
shown how, on the assumption of just one substantive moral premise, it is no longer surprising that we 
ended up with true moral beliefs.  
Enoch assumes that anything that promotes survival is at least somewhat good. If that’s right, 
then when X promotes survival, X is good. But when X promotes survival, because of the evolutionary 
story, we should also not be surprised that we ended up believing that X is good (it will make us more 
likely to pursue X). This gives us an explanation of the striking correlation of our moral beliefs with 
the moral facts.40 This sort of reply could at the very least succeed against versions of the Standard 
EDA that identify the fundamental epistemological problem as one of accidental reliability or 
coincidental truth, since if we have an explanation of the correlation of our beliefs and their truth, their 
                                                 
37 See Shafer-Landau (2012): 32-35, Horn (forthcoming), Behrends (2013): 7-8, Vavova (2014): 81, and 
Morton (2016). 
38 See Schafer (2010): 475-476; Shafer-Landau (2012): 21-23; Enoch (2011): 175; Setiya (2012): 79; 
White (2011): sec. 4.2; Vavova (2014): sec. 3.1; Berker (2014): sec. 8; Dogramaci (2016). See also Clarke-
Doane (2012) and Bedke (2009): sec. 3.2, although these are more general overgeneralization worries. 
39 Enoch (2011): ch. 7; Schafer (2010): 477; Wielenberg (2010); Brosnan (2011); Skarsaune (2011); Parfit 
(2011): 532-533; Setiya (2012): ch. 2; Dworkin (1996): 125. 
40 See Enoch (2011): 7.4. 
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truth is not a coincidence, nor is our reliability accidental. And it may be harnessed as a reply to safety- 
and sensitivity-based worries (though I cannot pursue this question here). So I will assume No Moral 
Claims because our question here is only of interest if it is true. 
SECTION 4: A CHALLENGE FOR ANY THEISTIC REPLY  
  
But No Moral Claims isn’t just a problem for the Natural reply. In this section I’ll 
issue a challenge to any theistic reply to the Standard EDA: the theist seems bound to 
appeal to a substantive moral claim in the course of what I’ll argue is her best line of 
response to the Standard EDA. I think that the theist can answer the challenge. It’s just that 
answering the challenge turns the theistic reply into something far different than the Natural 
Reply.  
The theist’s job, in giving a distinctly theistic reply to the Standard EDA, is to show 
that, on the assumption of theism, the following claim is true: 
Divine Action: God has intentionally acted so as to bring about (or make 
likely) our moral knowledge.41 
 
Of course there are logically possible alternatives here, which still make appeal to God. 
Perhaps, for example, God unintentionally brought about our moral knowledge. But these 
alternatives seem so implausible that the theist, in appealing to them, would no longer have 
a minimally plausible response to the Standard EDA.  So, since theism doesn’t on its own 
                                                 
41 Bogardus (2016) seems to think that the theist can reply to the Standard EDA while denying Divine 
Action. He argues that theists can appeal to divine testimony or a God-given moral faculty (see especially 
p. 7, 12-13). This may be so. However, take what I say here as an attempt at a theistic reply that is done via 
natural theology alone, and without denying that the evolutionary explanation of our moral faculties is as 
good as debunkers claim it is. 
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entail Divine Action, the theist must convince us that we get Divine Action on the 
assumption that God exists.  
 Here’s what I consider a very natural way of doing this. An omniscient, perfectly 
rational being—which the God of theism is—will plausibly always do what he has most 
overall normative reason (henceforth “reason”) to do. (Aquinas endorses a similar thesis—
but about the good rather than normative reasons—when he claims that the “voluntary 
appetite tends to a good which is apprehended.”42) This requires only a minimal type of 
motivational internalism, according to which a perfect being’s motives are in proportion to 
his/her reasons, and that in such beings there is no weakness of will. So, the theist should 
argue that God at some point had most overall reason to bring about our moral knowledge. 
This would ideally involve two separate arguments: an argument that God had reason to 
bring about our moral knowledge, and an argument that this reason was not outweighed by 
any other reasons God had at the time. (That God has reasons—even moral reasons—to 
act doesn’t, of course, commit us to the controversial claim that God has moral obligations, 
since God could have a (moral) reason to Φ without having an obligation to Φ.43) 
Unfortunately, the second task is a huge one. But I take it as prima facie plausible 
that the God of theism wouldn’t have strong reason to do anything incompatible with our 
moral knowledge—at least, such reason wouldn’t be strong enough to outweigh his reason 
to bring about our moral knowledge. (If I am wrong about this, then we were all silly to 
assume that the theist could ever have a response to the Standard EDA: God would not 
                                                 
42 See Aquinas (1485/1948): first part of the second part, question 8. See also Leftow (2005).  
43 See Alston (1990) for an argument that God has no moral obligations. 
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have ever brought about our moral knowledge!) Importantly, accounts that require this 
stipulation won’t, just in virtue of this, violate No Moral Claims. That there are no counter-
balancing reasons for God not to bring about our moral knowledge merely enables, but 
does not explain, why God would bring about our moral knowledge. Rather, God’s reasons 
explain why he would so act. Thus, a response that requires that God not have counter-
balancing reason not to bring about our moral knowledge doesn’t rely on this claim, in the 
technical sense I use here, and so such a response won’t violate No Moral Claims. So, I 
will assume here that if the theist has shown that God at some point had reason to bring 
about our moral knowledge, he has thereby shown that Divine Action is true. 
The challenge to the theist is this. It seems initially as if God’s reason to bring about 
our moral knowledge must be a moral reason. And if so, that is bad news, since that God 
has moral reason to bring about our moral knowledge is a substantive moral claim. But 
what other kind of reason could God have to bring about our moral knowledge—an 
epistemic reason? Surely our moral knowledge is not a means to God’s having true beliefs. 
A prudential reason? But it seems strange to say that God can ever be benefited, since this 
seems to imply that he was not perfectly well-off before. And even if this weren’t a 
problem, it’s not clear how our moral knowledge would benefit God. It is therefore unclear 
how the theist could meet the challenge laid out here. (I’ll explain shortly, however, why 
we ought to reformulate the challenge.) 
So in short, the theist needs to either show why God had a non-moral reason to 
bring about our moral knowledge, or find some way of arguing for Divine Action other 
than what I suggest above. If neither can be done, then the theistic gambit is bankrupt: the 
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theist cannot reply to the Standard EDA without relying on a substantive moral claim, 
which I’ve argued is illicit.  
It’s important to see that this is just as much a challenge for theistic replies to any 
of the epistemological objections that I have mentioned. Recall that they all share the same 
conclusion: if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substantive moral knowledge. 
So, if theistic responses to the Standard EDA require the theist to show Divine Action, then 
likewise for the other objections. In each case, the theist needs to show the same thing: that 
God intentionally brought about our moral knowledge. In order to reply to any of the 
objections I’ve mentioned, the theist must argue for Divine Action without appealing to 
substantive moral claims. 
SECTION 5: HOPE FOR THE THEISTIC MORAL REALIST  
 
Thus far, I have played the pessimist. I have issued a challenge that, if unanswered, 
entails that theists are not in any privileged position with regard to answering 
epistemological objections to moral realism. But in this final section of the paper, I want 
to explore whether the theist can answer this challenge. I will outline and evaluate two 
ways in which the theist could reply to the Standard EDA—and thus the other 
epistemological objections mentioned here—without violating No Moral Claims (or rather, 
the condition as it ought to be formulated, which I am about to lay out). I conclude that the 
theist actually can successfully reply to epistemological objections to moral realism, in a 
way that non-theists cannot.   
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It’s very important to see that No Moral Claims is too broad a restriction, as stated. 
Recall the dialectic: debunkers argue that what causes problems for our moral knowledge 
is the claim that moral truths are constitutively independent of anyone’s attitudes. What 
motivates No Moral Claims is the idea that, when a realist relies on a moral claim in her 
response to the Standard EDA, she’s relying on exactly the kind of claim knowledge of 
which the debunker is targeting. So, it seems that No Moral Claims ought to be restricted: 
No Moral Claims*: A reply to an epistemological objection to moral realism 
cannot rely on a substantive moral premise that, if true, is 
true independent of anyone’s attitudes.  
 
Since it is only attitude-independent moral claims that the Standard EDA targets, surely it 
should only be such claims that are off-limits in replying to the Standard EDA.  
 So, the moral realist needs to establish that God has a reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge without relying on any claim that is both a substantive moral claim and 
attitude-independent if true. In the remainder of this section, I first want to show two ways 
that the theist could do this. In the next section, I’ll show why the same general strategy 
works even for normative realists replying to epistemological worries for normative 
realism.  
 The key insight in the theistic realist’s response is that moral realists need not think 
that all reasons are attitude-independent. Indeed, that some reasons are fully explained by 
attitudes seems to be relatively uncontroversial: in Mark Schroeder’s example, Ronnie has 
a reason to go to the dance, while Bradley doesn’t. Why? Because Ronnie likes dancing, 
and Bradley can’t stand it. Realists of any stripe, Schroeder claims, should agree that some 
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reasons are explained by our attitudes in this way.44 Schroeder’s Humean Theory of 
Reasons is the further, controversial claim that all reasons are so explained.  
I think Schroeder is right about this. It is possible that Ronnie only has a reason to 
go to the dance because he likes dancing and because you have a reason to do what you 
like doing—and so on for all reasons that are partially explained by attitudes, such that no 
reason is fully explained by attitudes—but this seems somewhat forced. Indeed, it is most 
natural to read the debate about realism as analogous to the debate about reasons 
internalism/externalism: the former claims that reasons always entail (or are explained by) 
some motivational states, whereas the latter deny this, claiming that sometimes we can have 
reasons without the relevant motivational states.45 Realism should be read as merely 
denying the anti-realistic claim that all moral facts are mind-dependent. This is, at the very 
least, the kind of realism debunkers are concerned with.46 At any rate, this is the kind of 
realism I am concerned with here. So we need not worry about whether any given 
normative claim that the theist relies on is a substantive moral claim, so long as that claim 
is one such that, if true, its truth is fully explained by some agent’s (or agents’) attitudes.  
 God, of course, has attitudes, and there doesn’t seem to be any barrier to those 
attitudes explaining his reasons, just as our attitudes often explain our reasons. The task for 
the theistic moral realist is to find an attitude that God plausibly has that could fully explain 
his reason to bring about our moral knowledge. The theist must, however, do this in a way 
                                                 
44 Schroeder (2007): 1-2. 
45 Finlay and Schroeder (2017). 
46 Street (2006): 110. 
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that doesn’t invite further questions about why God has that attitude. Otherwise, it might 
be that while God’s reason is grounded in an attitude, he only holds that attitude because 
some mind-independent, substantive moral claim is true—then the theist’s story would still 
violate No Moral Claims*.  
  Suppose, then, that God wants us to have moral knowledge because it will be good 
for us. He wants what is good for us simply because he loves us—and that seems like as 
good a place as any to end an explanation. Thus God’s reason to bring about our moral 
knowledge is satisfactorily explained—in a way that does not demand further 
explanation—by his love for us. This reason is thus explained by someone’s attitudes—i.e. 
God’s—and so the theist does not violate No Moral Claims* in relying on the claim that it 
obtains. 
But why think that moral knowledge will be good for us? Because it makes us 
resemble God more, no matter what the moral truths are, and it is good for us to resemble 
God. First, since God knows the moral truths (because he knows everything), our knowing 
them makes us more like him. Second, moral knowledge will help us to do what we have 
moral reason to do, regardless of what that is, since we are much more likely to do what 
we have moral reason to do if we know what that is. To the extent that we do what we have 
moral reason to do, we more closely resemble God, since God does what he has moral 
reason to do.  
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As Robert Adams has pointed out, the notion of resemblance presents some peculiar 
problems.47 It’s not clear what resemblance is for one thing, since merely sharing a property 
is not enough: a squirrel could have the same number of hairs as me and not resemble me 
any more than an otherwise identical squirrel. Furthermore, merely resembling God is not 
sufficient for goodness: parodies resemble their objects but do not share in their virtues. 
(Though Adams is concerned with goodness rather than the good-for relation, we might 
have a related worry about the latter: I may parody God, and thus resemble him, and be 
worse-off for it.)  
I can only dip into such deep waters here, but it is worth noting that while our 
theistic realist will eventually want to flesh out her theory of resemblance, the issue doesn’t 
present the problems it does for Adams, and so is not nearly so pressing. Adams is so 
worried about the above worries in large part because he needs to make sure to give a 
realistic account of resemblance—one on which the fact that two things resemble each 
other obtains mind-independently. He has to worry about this because on his view, all 
goodness is grounded in resembling God, such that an anti-realistic understanding of 
resemblance would result in thorough-going anti-realism about the good, which he wants 
to avoid.48 But our theistic moral realist is not committed to the claim that goodness is 
always grounded in resembling God—just that this is sometimes the case.  And so, even if 
resemblance—or the conditions under which resemblance to God is good for someone—
is mind-dependent, this would only commit us to the claim that well-being is sometimes 
                                                 
47 Adams (1999): 31-33. 
48 Adams (1999): 18.  
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mind-dependent. And that is consistent with realism as I’ve defined it—even realism about 
well-being in particular.  
 Now, it might be objected that my explanation above appeals to substantive moral 
claims. After all, I said that (i) God knows the moral truth, that (ii) God does what he has 
moral reason to do, that (iii) knowing the moral truth will help us do what we have moral 
reason to do, and that (because of all this) (iv) we resemble God insofar as we have moral 
knowledge. Are none of (i-iv) substantive, mind-independent moral claims? After all, they 
each use the word “moral”, variously making claims about moral knowledge, moral truth, 
and moral reasons.  
 We saw above that (iv) might be mind-dependent, and the theistic realist can 
consistently endorse this. But that won’t help with (i-iii). So I will argue that the theist 
avoids violating No Moral Claims* here because none of (i-iv) is a substantive moral claim. 
As I noted above, defining “substantive moral claim” is very hard, and I argued that we 
only need a non-definitional characterization of such claims: they’re the set of claims 
knowledge of which debunkers are targeting. While I don’t intend to give a definition of 
“substantive moral claim”, I think the following is a good test, at least for claims that do 
not represent principles: a claim is a substantive moral claim only if its truth value changes 
depending on what we have moral reason to do.49 But (i-iv) will be true regardless of what 
anyone has moral reason to do.  
                                                 
49 As I note in the main text, moral principles are an exception: they are often substantive, while being 
compatible with the obtaining of any moral reasons. “If punching John shortens his life, then we have 
moral reason to refrain from punching him” is technically compatible with both having moral reason to 
refrain from punching John and not having such reason (after all, the conditional is compatible with the 
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Consider (i): God, because he knows everything, knows the moral truth regardless 
of what moral reasons obtain or fail to obtain. If rational beings have moral reason to 
maximize utility, then he knows this. If rational beings have no such reason, he knows this. 
Now consider (ii): whether God has moral reason to deceive or refrain from deception, to 
kill or refrain from killing, he will still do what he has moral reason to do. Similarly for 
(iii): whether we have moral reason to lie or not (etc.), knowing the moral truth will help 
us do what we have moral reason to do. And finally, consider (iv): because of the foregoing, 
we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowledge, regardless of what anyone has 
moral reason to do.50  
 Before I move on to consider a second strategy for the theistic realist, let’s consider 
a second objection: this first strategy relies on claims about well-being, or the good-for 
relation. Is well-being a moral phenomenon? If so, then insofar as such truths are attitude-
independent, the theist cannot rely on substantive claims about well-being, such as that it 
is good for us to resemble God.  
 The theist might try replying that the good-for relation is non-moral. I think this is 
right, but for reasons that will soon become clear, this won’t help the cause. The theist 
ought instead to argue that the claims about well-being required to make his case are not 
true independent of anyone’s attitudes. Having desires satisfied, experiencing pleasure, 
                                                 
falsity of the antecedent). But we can brush aside such examples here, since we’re not aiming for a sure-fire 
test for some claim’s being a substantive moral one. The test seems like a good one for claims like (i-iv).   
50 One might think there is cause for worry here if Robert Adams is right that for any non-supreme good, X 
is good because X resembles God, the supreme Good (see Adams (1999): chapter 1). But even if this is 
true, claims about resemblance to God need not be substantive moral claims. That goodness is fully 
grounded in property P does not entail that claims about P are moral claims. The hedonistic utilitarian need 
not say that claims about pain and pleasure are moral claims, after all. 
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being happy: all of these states can fully explain an increase in well-being, without 
conflicting with moral realism, as explained above. Not only that, such explanations are 
compatible even with objectivist theories of well-being, since objectivist theories allow 
that sometimes having a desire satisfied (etc.) is a benefit.  
And it’s easy to make that case that moral knowledge will promote such states 
without relying on any substantive moral claims: we will be happy/have more desires 
filled/experience more pleasure insofar as we resemble God, regardless of what anyone has 
moral reason to do. These claims are generally plausible on the assumption of most theistic 
views: does God want us to resemble him even though it won’t make us happier, or fulfill 
any of our desires? No—promotion of such states seems like one of the main reasons he 
would desire that we resemble him. 
 A second general route for the theistic moral realist also appeals to the claim that 
we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowledge, and helps itself to claims (i-iv) 
above in order to establish that. But instead of arguing that it is good for us that we resemble 
God, the theist could here argue that God desires his own glorification, and he doesn’t 
desire this for any further reason—he just desires it.51 Furthermore, the theist could argue, 
it glorifies God to have his creation resemble him. Therefore, God’s desire for his own 
glorification grounds a reason to bring about our moral knowledge.  
 It seems perfectly in line with the theistic picture to say that God desires his own 
glorification. Furthermore, this is consistent with God being perfectly well-off, since it 
                                                 
51 This is a weakness of the second strategy that the first does not have: God may only desire his own 
glorification because it is good (or because he has reason to, etc.). In that case, the theist may have to 
appeal to a mind-independent moral claim, thus violating No Moral Claims*.  
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seems possible for a perfectly well-off being to have desires. (At any rate, the theist is in 
much deeper trouble if God has no desires: it is a common assumption among theists that 
there are things God wants us to do.) And of course, if God’s reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge is explained by his desire for glorification, the theist won’t here run afoul 
of No Moral Claims*.  
SECTION 6: EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO NORMATIVE REALISM  
 
What I have called the Standard EDA targets moral realism. Yet many 
epistemological objections, such as Street’s, have it that if normative realism is true, then 
we have no normative knowledge.52 (Normative realism is the thesis that (i) sincere 
normative judgments express beliefs, (ii) some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth 
of some normative beliefs does not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or 
hypothetical agent.) This begets the worry that an analogue of No Moral Claims holds:  
No Normative Claims: A reply to an epistemological objection to normative 
realism cannot rely on a substantive normative 
premise. 
 
And this is worrisome for the theist in particular because both of the theistic responses I 
proposed to the Standard EDA rely on substantive normative premises. 
However, just as with the Standard EDA, I think that No Normative Claims is over-
broad. Normative realism allows that some reasons are explained by our attitudes: Ronnie 
                                                 
52 Street (2006). 
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likes dancing and Bradley doesn’t, and that is enough to explain why Ronnie has a reason 
to go to the party but Bradley doesn’t. So just as in the moral case, we ought to reformulate 
our constraint:  
No Normative Claims*: A reply to an epistemological objection to normative 
realism cannot rely on a substantive normative 
premise that, if true, is true independent of anyone’s 
attitudes.  
 
Because he doesn’t violate this suitably qualified constraint, the theist can now simply 
import his two responses to the Standard EDA, suitably modified. We resemble God 
insofar as we have any kind of knowledge, after all, or insofar as we are disposed to act in 
accordance with any kind of reason. So, whether God’s reason springs from his desire for 
our well-being or his desire for glorification, he will have a reason to bring about all 
normative knowledge in us. 
CONCLUSION  
 
Many philosophers take it as a truism that theists need not worry at all over 
various epistemological objections to moral realism: if God exists, certainly he could just 
engineer things in such a way that we end up with moral knowledge. But the most natural 
ways of arguing for this are stripped from us when we recognize that we cannot rely on 
any substantive moral claims. However, there is hope for the theist: God plausibly has 
mind-dependent reasons to bring about our moral knowledge. If so, then the theist can 
reply to epistemological objections to moral realism without begging the question. Not 
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only that, but she can reply to epistemological objections to normative realism without 
begging the question. The upshot here is nothing so grand as that moral/normative 
realists ought to be theists. However, it might be as significant as that theists are better 
off with respect to epistemological objections to moral/normative realism than are non- 
theists. To the extent that such objections succeed, non-theistic realism fails while theistic 



































It is wrong for John to kick my cat because it will cause the cat serious pain, but 
also because it is wrong for people to cause serious pain in certain circumstances. This 
suggests the following structure: some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative 
facts and normative principles. As I will construe this, it is a claim about the metaphysical 
grounds of normative facts. Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse this 
view generally—that particular normative facts are often partially grounded in normative 
principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis about 
partial grounding in principles, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. 
I then consider two ways in which the non-naturalist position could be modified or 
expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. 




The notion of ground, according to its promoters, has been integral to the enterprise 
of philosophy,53 and in particular, ethics54 for a long time. While it is a primitive idiom, it 
is fairly intuitive: that one fact obtains in virtue of another, that one is explained by another, 
that one is grounded in another—these all express the same notion.55 Furthermore, the 
notion of ground helps us make sense of many philosophical claims. Some claim that a 
thing has its dispositions in virtue of its categorical features—the glass is fragile in virtue 
of the molecules that make it up, as well as the laws of chemistry and physics. Legal 
positivists claim that the grounds of laws are wholly social, consisting in things like the 
acts of officials and social practices.56 Both claims make sense if they are about grounding 
relations.  
This brief defense of the notion of ground may be unsatisfying to some. I would 
first direct them to fuller defenses of grounding, especially those in footnote 1. But second, 
I make the following plea: surely there is some broad metaphysical dependence relation 
that plays an integral role in philosophy, or at least in ethics. How else can we make sense 
of the Euthyphro dilemma, which challenges us to specify the direction of dependence 
between our moral beliefs and the moral facts? Or the ordinary sense in which pain can 
make someone’s life bad? Or the idea that, for those with non-naturalist leanings, it is 
simply not enough for normative properties to be distinct from non-normative properties, 
but that normative properties cannot be exhaustively constituted by non-normative 
                                                 
53 See, most prominently, Rosen (2010), Schaffer (2009), Fine (2012a), and Correia and Schneider (2012).  
54 See Berker (MS), as well as Dancy (1981). 
55 I here treat grounding as a relation between facts—as opposed to, say, a sentential operator—though this 
is not essential to any of my arguments.  
56 Both examples are from Rosen (2010): 110. 
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properties? We need some broad notion of metaphysical dependence to interpret these 
claims. Call it “constitution,” or call it “grounding”—my point will hold regardless, though 
I rely on the notion of ground here. 
While the grounding relation in particular is not essential to my point—any broad 
metaphysical dependence relation will do—I rely on that relation here. Let “Φ < Ψ” 
represent “Φ fully grounds Ψ,” where full ground is the primitive notion above. Let “Φ ‹ 
Ψ” represent “Φ partially grounds Ψ,” where that means that Φ, together with some other 
(possibly empty) set of facts, fully grounds Ψ. Thus, A,B < A&B, whereas A ‹ A&B.  
The grounding relation has a fairly complex pure logic.57 I need only outline a small 
part of it. Here are a few valid rules of inference:58  
 
Cut:   Δ1 < Ψ1 Δ2 < Ψ2 … Ψ1, Ψ2…< Λ 
           Δ1, Δ2…< Λ 
 
Transitivity:  Δ1 ‹ Δ2  Δ2 ‹ Δ3 
    Δ1 ‹ Δ3 
 
Irreflexivity:  Δ1 ‹ Δ1 
       ┴ 
 




                                                 
57 See Fine (2012a) and (2012b), as well as deRosset (2015). 
58 Of course, as with everything, these have been questioned. Those critical of irreflexivity include Wilson 
(2014) and Correia (2014). Schaffer (2012) is critical of transitivity. Raven (2013) and Litland (2013) 



















Transitivity simply allows us to chain two partial grounding relations to get another. 
Irreflexivity states that no fact partially (or, therefore, fully) grounds itself.  
 Finally, a “grounding tree” is what you see above in my diagram elucidating Cut—
although those trees are incomplete. A complete grounding tree for a given fact specifies 
the full grounds for that fact, and the grounds for those grounds, and so on until it “bottoms 
out” in ungrounded facts.59 A fact can have multiple trees, because it can have multiple full 
grounds (e.g., the fact that “P or Q” can be fully grounded in the fact that P, or the fact that 
Q). When I use diagrams in this paper to represent grounding trees, I’ll represent full 
grounding relations with solid arrows and partial grounding relations with dashed arrows. 
Unless I put an ellipsis to the right of a set of dashed arrows, let the reader assume that the 
partial grounding relations in question together constitute a full grounding relation.  
                                                 
59 See Rosen (2010): 111-112.  
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Δ1 Δ2 
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  Δ1 , Δ2… 
… 
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 This much of an outline of the grounding relation will suffice for my purposes here. 
What I’ve said here conforms to grounding orthodoxy, and furthermore, everything I’ve 
said here can be plausibly applied to whatever broad metaphysical dependence relation the 
grounding skeptic chooses to frame metaethical claims in terms of.  
SECTION 2: STRUCTURED NON-NATURALISM  
 
Non-naturalism is the claim that there are sui generis normative entities of some 
kind.60 Where substantive normative facts are just those normative facts that are not 
principles, I think that non-naturalists are committed to the following claim: 
No Full: Some substantive normative facts or principles are not fully 
metaphysically grounded in non-normative facts. 
 
Ralf Bader argues that on non-naturalism, No Full must be true.61 Barry Maguire 
formulates the autonomy thesis about the ethical in such a way that, insofar as non-
naturalists are committed to autonomy—and they seem to be—they also must accept a 
thesis that entails No Full.62 Some non-naturalists even seem sympathetic to the idea that 
No Full is actually a definition of non-naturalism.63 (I do not think that No Full is a 
definition of non-naturalism—only a commitment of the view. As we’ll see later, there are 
other conditions failing which would disqualify a position from being non-naturalist.) 
                                                 
60 Shafer-Landau (2003): 55; Smith (2013): 28; McPherson (2012). However, non-naturalism is often 
defined as the claim that there are irreducibly normative properties/facts--see Parfit (2011): 464; Enoch 
(2011): 1. See also Ridge (2014) and Cuneo (2007). 
61 Bader (forthcoming).  
62 Maguire (2015): 194. 
63 See Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014): 401-403, though the authors speak in terms of truth-making, not 
grounding. 
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 My argument is fairly simple: unless non-naturalists accept No Full, they cannot 
distinguish themselves from non-reductive naturalists like David Brink.64 Such naturalists 
deny that normative (in Brink’s case: moral) facts are identical to non-normative ones, yet 
argue for some sort of full metaphysical dependence of the normative on the non-
normative. In Brink’s case, this dependence relation is constitution. But surely there is 
nothing special here about constitution, as opposed to other robust metaphysical 
dependence relations. The non-reductive naturalist gets to keep her naturalism not because 
she endorses the constitution relation in particular, but because she endorses some type of 
exhaustive metaphysical dependence of the normative on the non-normative. So the non-
naturalist, to distinguish herself from the non-reductive naturalist, must deny the full 
metaphysical dependence of the normative on the non-normative. Since grounding is a type 
of this dependence, the non-naturalist must accept No Full. 
 Once the non-naturalist accepts No Full—as I have argued he must—then it is very 
natural to accept a further claim, namely: 
Structure: All substantive normative facts are partially metaphysically 
grounded in normative principles. 
 
I’ll work with atomic substantive normative facts, for simplicity. Where “Na” is the fact 
that a has normative property N, “Δ” is a set of non-normative facts, and “P” is a normative 
principle, those who believe Structure think that the trees of particular normative facts look 
like this: 
                                                 
64 Brink (1989): 6.5 and 7.1. See also FitzPatrick’s (2008) criticism of Shafer-Landau’s (2003: 74-79) 
view. 
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For context, compare this to Ralf Bader’s view, on which the role of principles is to stand 
outside the grounding relation and “govern” it, just as causal laws govern the cause-effect 
relation, without themselves beings amongst the causes, or inference laws warrant 
conclusions without themselves being premises.65 Importantly, causal laws are not the 
same kind of thing as causes (events), and inference rules are not the same kind of thing as 
premises (propositions). So also, normative principles are not the same kind of thing as 
grounds. That is, they are not facts, but entities that govern the grounding relation between 
facts.   
Many non-naturalists believe Structure. Among them is T.M. Scanlon:  
It might be tempting to say that mixed normative claims…are “true in virtue of” 
non-normative claims…But this would be misleading insofar as it suggested that 
they are true only in virtue of the truth of these claims, neglecting the role of pure 
normative claims in determining how this is the case.66 
 
Barry Maguire is even more explicit: “particular ethical facts obtain in virtue of more 
general ethical facts together with pertinent non-ethical facts.”67 There are other authors 
who gesture at Structure, as well.68 
                                                 
65 Bader (forthcoming). 
66 Scanlon (2014): 40. 
67 Maguire (2015): 194. 




 And it’s easy to see why. First, it seems that normative principles play some role in 
explaining other normative facts. Suppose I’m asked why it was wrong for Wu to destroy 
the rug. I might answer: “Well, because it caused Jeffrey a lot of trouble, and it’s wrong to 
cause other people lots of trouble.” Abstracting from the question of whether the principle 
I cite is true, there seems to be nothing odd about my explanation: people give similar 
explanations all the time. But if principles aren’t amongst the grounds of the normative 
facts being explained, what other explanatory role could they play?  
Second, many (such as Maguire) go further than No Full, arguing that normative 
facts are never fully grounded in the non-normative. If that’s right, then Structure seems 
all but inevitable: particular normative facts will never be fully grounded in the non-
normative. However, they’re also bad candidates for being ungrounded: that John’s act was 
good is explained by something. So on this view, particular normative facts need to be 
partially grounded in another normative fact—and what better candidate than a principle 
that links the particular normative fact to its non-normative grounds? Call the conjunction 
of non-naturalism and Structure “structured non-naturalism.” I will spend most of the rest 
of the paper arguing that structured non-naturalism is incoherent.  
SECTION 3: THE INCOHERENCE OF STRUCTURED NON-NATURALISM  
 
Structured non-naturalists claim that substantive normative facts are partially 
grounded in principles. What will principles look like? I can see three possible answers to 
this question, and there’s trouble in each case. Here’s an outline of the argument: 
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The Master Argument 
1. If Structure is true, then principles are either generalizations, grounding-facts, or some sort 
of ungrounded fact. 
2. If principles are generalizations, then grounding is not irreflexive. 
3. If principles are grounding-facts, then non-naturalism is false. 
4. Principles are not some sort of ungrounded fact. 
5. So, if Structure is true, then either grounding is not irreflexive or non-naturalism is false. 
6. Grounding is irreflexive. 
7. So, if Structure is true, then non-naturalism is false. 
 
I leave (6) as a very plausible assumption (see above). So, I will now argue for (1-4).  
3.1 Defense of (1) 
 
Principles are either generalizations, grounding-facts, or some sort of ungrounded 
fact. Let me emphasize up-front that this is a simplification. There are at least a few other 
ways of understanding normative principles—they could, for example, be hedged 
generalizations. But I think that any other way of understanding principles will have the 
same problems as one of the three options here considered.  
It is very natural to think of principles as universal generalizations. This is how 
Russ Shafer-Landau thinks of them, for example.69 Why is it wrong for you to wantonly 
destroy Jeffrey’s rug? Because it was Jeffrey’s property (non-normative fact), and all acts 
in which someone else’s property is wantonly destroyed are wrong (principle). This makes 
it sound like we end up with a generalization: 
∀x(Dx→Nx)70 
                                                 
69 Shafer-Landau (1997) and (2003): 268, fn. 2.  
70 For a novel way of reading generalizations that differs from this, see Fine (2015) and Fine (2016). I 
don’t consider this approach simply for reasons of space.  
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Furthermore, we might think of this generalization as being preceded by either a “it is a 
law that” operator, or by a necessity operator of some kind. (Whether moral principles are 
normatively or metaphysically necessary is controversial,71 and won’t matter for my 
argument here.) 
But it is equally natural to read the principle here as claiming: “All acts that are not 
utility-maximizing are wrong in virtue of that very fact.” After all, utilitarians don’t seem 
to be arguing just for the necessary coincidence of (e.g.) wrongness and failure to maximize 
utility. That’s compatible with God arbitrarily orchestrating such a coincidence, and this 
seems out of sync with utilitarianism—the utility facts explain the wrongness facts! So it 
might be that normative principles are facts about grounding relations.72 For example, it’s 
ultimately wrong to destroy Jeffrey’s rug because: 
∀x(Dx ‹ Nx) 
The grounding here must be partial, since by stipulation—recall Structure—the principle, 
and thus this very grounding fact, partially grounds the wrongness of your act, and 
therefore the fact that it doesn’t maximize utility cannot be a (non-redundant) full ground. 
It may seem that understanding principles in this way is doomed from the start. 
After all, the structure we end up with here is that (A ‹ B) ‹ B, and one might think that a 
fact cannot be even partially grounded in the fact that this very fact is partially grounded 
in another. But I believe that we are independently committed to this type of grounding 
                                                 
71 See Fine (2012a): 38 and Rosen (MS).  
72 See Berker (MS), §4. 
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structure. Consider the following fact: F or ∃x( F ‹ x). (Let F be some fact that obtains 







Notice, however, that on the righthand side, by transitivity, we get that (F ‹  (F or ∃x(F ‹ 
x))) ‹ (F or ∃x(F ‹ x)). And this exhibits the disputed pattern: (A ‹ B) ‹ B. 
Here’s why the fact that F or ∃x(F ‹ x) is grounded in the way I propose. Because 
we know that F obtains (it does so necessarily, by stipulation), we know that the left branch 
obtains, assuming that whenever A obtains, A < (A or B).73 But because F fully grounds 
(F or ∃x(F ‹ x)), we know that F fully grounds something (and therefore partially grounds 
something). So, we know that ∃x(F ‹ x), and again, because it’s the righthand disjunct, this 
fact fully grounds that (F or ∃x(F ‹ x)). Finally, in the bottom right, we know that F ‹ (F or 
∃x(F ‹ x)), since this is entailed by the lefthand branch. Furthermore, this fact fully grounds 
that ∃x(F ‹ x): that F grounds a particular fact—namely, that (F or ∃x(F ‹ x))—itself 
                                                 
73 Fine (2010) has shown that this is not generally true, but Litland (2015) shows how it can be properly 
restricted, and the restricted version would still work for my purposes here.  
F or ∃x(F ‹ x) 
F 
F ‹ (F or ∃x(F ‹ x)) 
 
∃x(F ‹ x) 
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grounds something.74 But now I’ve shown that each component of the picture above 
obtains, and by transitivity, this gives us (F ‹ (F or ∃x(F ‹ x))) ‹ (F or ∃x(F ‹ x)). So I think 
that we ought to take seriously the suggestion that principles are grounding facts: it is 
possible that (A ‹ B) ‹ B. 
 But perhaps all this is wrong-headed. Perhaps normative principles are of a kind 
that need not be grounded at all. Such has been suggested by some of the same authors who 
have endorsed Structure. Maguire says that his view commits him to the claim that “there 
will be ethical facts of some kind (presumably ethical principles) that ground other facts 
but that are not themselves grounded”.75 Scanlon and Enoch also suggest such a view.76  
Tim Maudlin develops a parallel view, on which laws of nature are fundamental.77 What 
normative principles would have to be in order to be ungrounded will not concern me here, 
since my objection to this view will not turn on that issue.  
Now, there’s not much more that I can say in defense of (1), except for the following 
informal reflection. Whatever principles are, they’ve got to be the kind of thing that “takes 
in” non-normative facts and “spits out” normative facts. This is so because, on structured 
non-naturalism, the function of the principles is to bridge the gap between the non-
normative and the normative—after all, as non-naturalists, structured non-naturalists 
believe that the normative cannot be fully grounded in the non-normative. So, it’s natural 
to think of them as universally quantifying over a conditional, with the non-normative as 
                                                 
74 I rely on the principle that when Φa obtains, Φa < ∃xΦx, which Kramer (2013) presents a problem for. 
But the problem cases involve self-grounding, which my case doesn’t.   
75 Maguire (2015): 195. 
76 Enoch (2011): 148; Scanlon (2014): 2, 40-41.  
77 Maudlin (2007): 17-18. 
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the antecedent and the normative as the consequent, or as grounding-facts like the above. 
Such structures bridge the gap between the non-normative and the normative, and it’s hard 
to see what else could, without falling prey to one of the problems I mention below. 
3.2 Defense of (2)  
 
If normative principles are generalizations, then partial grounding is not irreflexive. 
That is, if principles are generalizations, then some facts partially ground themselves. The 
reason why is fairly simple. A universal generalization is at least partially grounded in its 
instances, such that each instance partially grounds the generalization.78 So the fact that 
∀x(Dx→Nx) will be partially grounded in the fact that Da→Na (where “Da” is a member 
of Δ). But the fact that Da→Na will be partially grounded in the fact that Na (though 
conditionals are often grounded in false antecedent and consequents, it cannot be so here: 
it is the fact that Na that is being grounded, so it must obtain). So by Transitivity, the fact 





                                                 
78 For all I’ve said, Rosen (channeling Russell) might be right that generalizations can’t be fully grounded 








Thus, if principles are generalizations, then partial grounding is not irreflexive: facts can 
partially ground themselves. 
Putting a necessity operator—of whatever strength—in front of the generalization 
won’t help, either. This new fact may require further grounds in addition to its instances—
as Rosen suggests, maybe laws of essence79—but its instances are still part of the 
explanation. (If not, and the essence is the full ground, then the structured non-naturalist 
will have the problem I’ve already mentioned: that such essentialist facts seem distinctively 
naturalistic.) Likewise with the “it is a law that” operator: depending on one’s view of laws, 
the law will either be at least partially grounded in its instances or be fundamental (in which 
case, see section 3.4). 
                                                 








Now, it might seem as if a quick fix is at hand. The problem came about because a 
certain property instantiation is grounded in a principle whose consequent ascribes that 
very same property. But why not think that a fact about wrongness could be grounded in a 








Not only is this consistent with the irreflexivity of ground, but it can seem to make sense 
of the intuition that wrongness obtains in virtue of facts about badness. 
 But the problem remains. First, the structured non-naturalist will see an explanatory 
gap in this picture. Have I fully explained the fact that my act is wrong if I tell you that is 
has some non-normative features, and that if it has those features, it’s bad? No—I’ve yet 
to tell you why the act is wrong. We seem to need another principle connecting badness 



















And then, on the righthand branch, we get the same result: grounding is not irreflexive. 
 Perhaps we don’t need this extra principle on the righthand side. Even still, the 
problem persists. The fact that my act is bad, after all, does not seem like it could be 
fundamental (i.e., ungrounded): something must explain why it is bad. (Though this 
follows from the plausible principle that particular instantiations of normative properties 
are not fundamental, my argument hereafter only requires that there be one particular 














features seem relevant to my act’s badness: it was bad because it caused pain, for example. 
But that can’t be the only ground for my act’s badness, for the non-naturalist—then that 
my act was wrong would be fully grounded in non-normative facts. So, there will need to 









Notice that the non-normative facts grounding that my act is bad are different from those 
that ground that my act is wrong, lest we end up with another failure of irreflexivity. This 










the non-normative facts that are relevant to that act’s badness are also relevant to its 
wrongness.  
 But of course the most straightforward problem is that grounding will again fail to 
be irreflexive. For now our new principle (“∀x(D1x→Bx)”) will be partially grounded in 
its instances, and my act’s badness will be partially grounded in my act’s badness. Now of 
course, someone could object in the same way as in the first case—that my act’s badness 
could be grounded in a principle concerning some other normative property than badness. 
But the problem will reiterate, and (because particular instantiations of normative 
properties are generally not brute) will continue to do so until a property-instantiation is 
grounded in a principle that involves that same property. So unless infinite grounding 
chains with infinitely many simple normative properties are possible—they’re not—
grounding is not irreflexive, on this view of principles.  
3.3 Defense of (3)  
 
If normative principles are grounding-facts, then non-naturalism is false. For the 
most part—with a proviso to be mentioned shortly—this is because if principles are 
grounding-facts, then No Full is false. The argument in support of this is fairly complex, 
so here’s a rough outline: grounding-facts must be grounded. There are three basic ways 
they could be grounded, but on two of these ways, all substantive normative facts and 
principles will be fully grounded in non-normative facts. A third entails that non-naturalism 
is false in a unique way. So, if principles are grounding-facts, then non-naturalism is false.  
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 There is very good reason to think that grounding facts cannot be fundamental. 
First, grounding facts relate the fundamental to the non-fundamental, so they necessarily 
have non-fundamental components. Thus, Fundamentality entails that grounding facts 
cannot be fundamental. Second, as Karen Bennett points out, the fundamental entities—
whatever they are—are open to free modal recombination. If grounding relations are 
among those entities, then there is a possible world just like this one, but in which no 
grounding relations obtain. In such a world, the actually grounded entities either don’t exist 
or are fundamental. Neither option is plausible.80  
 The question of how grounding-facts are grounded has been answered in a number 
of ways. According to both Karen Bennett and Louis deRosset, when A < B, this fact is 
fully grounded in A.81 However, we need to know what grounds the fact that A ‹ B. 
Presumably it will still be A—but assume, for the sake of argument, that A only partially 
grounds the fact that A ‹ B. In our case, that means that Δ ‹ (Δ ‹ Na). Still, whatever else is 
necessary to fully ground the fact that Δ ‹ Na will also be non-normative: Na certainly can’t 
enter into the grounds, on pain of violating Irreflexivity. More generally, if normative facts 
enter into the grounds, then on this picture, we’ll just end up with an infinite chain of 
normative ground. So, we get the following tree for the fact that Na, on the 
Bennett/deRosset picture: 
                                                 
80 See Bennett (2011). The basis for this argument is in Schaffer (2010): 40.  




Λ here is a set—possibly empty, if the fact that A fully grounds that A ‹ B—of non-
normative facts, which together with Δ, fully grounds the fact that Δ ‹ Na. 
 On this picture, substantive normative facts and principles will all be fully grounded 
in non-normative facts, violating No Full. Δ is non-normative by stipulation. Call “Γ” 
whatever the full grounds of Δ are. It is clear that Γ will be wholly non-normative here: for 
example, the fact that an act fails to maximize utility (Δ) will just be grounded in facts 
about particular pleasures and pains. But we established above that the facts in Λ are all 
non-normative as well. But given this, we can prove the following via Cut: 
1. Γ < Δ 
2. Δ,Λ < (Δ ‹ Na) 
3. Δ,(Δ ‹ Na) < Na 
4. Therefore, Γ,Δ,Λ < Na. 
 
Since Γ, Δ, and Λ are all sets of non-normative facts, if a partial grounding-fact is even 
partially grounded in its first relatum, then on the Bennett/deRosset view, substantive 
Na 





normative facts and principles are all fully grounded in non-normative facts. In that case, 
No Full, and thus non-naturalism, is false. 
 So, the structured non-naturalist might turn to Jon Litland’s recent proposal for how 
to ground ground.82 Litland, following Fine,83 distinguishes between factive and non-
factive ground. Factive ground is the kind I have been relying on: when A factively grounds 
B, A and B both obtain. When A non-factively grounds B, neither need obtain. Litland 
argues that when A factively grounds B, this fact is grounded in the fact that A non-
factively grounds B, together with the fact that A. That A non-factively grounds B is itself 
zero-grounded—i.e., grounded in the members of the null set (i.e., none).84  
 Things get complicated when we ask how this account is supposed to extend to 
partial grounding-facts. The most natural way to extend the theory is to distinguish partial 
non-factive grounding from full non-factive grounding—although I know of no one 
explicitly doing so in the literature. Litland’s view can then be extended to say that full 
factive grounding-facts are grounded in full non-factive grounding facts (together with the 
ground), whereas partial factive grounding-facts are grounded in partial non-factive 
grounding-facts (together with the ground). Let “A « B” stand for “A partially non-
factively grounds B.” On structured non-naturalism this gives us the following tree for a 
grounded normative fact: 
                                                 
82 Litland (2017). Litland treats the term “ground” as an operator connecting sentences. I adapt the account 
here, simply to fit my approach. 
83 Fine (2012a): 48-50. 








But again, using Cut, we can prove that on this picture, substantive normative facts and 
principles are always fully grounded in non-normative facts. Again, let Γ be the set of non-
normative facts that ground Δ: 
1. Γ < Δ 
2. Ø < (Δ « Na) 
3. Δ,( Δ « Na) < (Δ ‹ Na) 
4. So, Γ,Ø < (Δ ‹ Na) 
5. Δ,( Δ ‹ Na) < Na 
6. Therefore, Γ, Γ,Ø < Na. 
 
Here we have two applications of Cut, with the odd but harmless result that “Γ” appears 
twice in the grounds of Na. I’ve already established that Γ will contain only non-normative 
facts; Ø is also a non-normative fact. So on Litland’s view, we again get the result that if 
normative principles are grounding-facts, then all normative facts are always fully 
grounded in non-normative facts.  
Na 
Δ  Δ ‹ Na 
Δ 
 
Δ « Na 
Ø 
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On an alternate picture advocated by Gideon Rosen, a grounding-fact is grounded 
in its first relatum, as well as some facts about essences.85 We can thus get something like 
the following tree for a normative fact:  
 
 
(“Db” is one member of Δ, but there it is possible that there are others—hence the ellipsis.) 
“◻N (∀x∀y(Dx→(Dx ‹ Ny)))” is the claim that it is in the nature of the normative property 
N that when such-and-such non-normative facts obtain, those facts ground such-and-such 
normative facts.  
 The problem is, the structured non-naturalist cannot take this route: as Rosen has 
pointed out in another paper, and as I briefly outline above, to claim that it is in the nature 
of the normative that some non-normative facts ground some normative facts is a distinctly 
naturalistic claim.86 (This is true even if the essentialist claim is a normative one, such that 
                                                 
85 Rosen (2010). See also Dasgupta (2014), which endorses a broader sort of view, and explores some of 
the consequences of Rosen’s particular version of it.  
86 Rosen (MS). 
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No Full is true: recall that No Full is only one commitment of non-naturalism.) After all, it 
is normative naturalists who claim that (e.g.) the wrongness of an action by its nature has 
something to do with the fact that that action fails to maximize utility, that that’s what it is 
for an action to be wrong. So, on Rosen’s picture, even though normative facts are not fully 
grounded in non-normative facts, non-naturalism is still false.  
 My defense of (3) has been long and somewhat complex. But the moral of the story 
is simple: on any of the main views of what grounds grounding facts, if normative 
principles are grounding-facts, then non-naturalism is false. On the Bennett/deRosset view, 
as well as Litland’s view, I’ve proven that normative facts will be fully grounded in non-
normative facts. On Rosen’s view, this won’t be the case, but the structured non-naturalist 
cannot appeal to such a view, since it entails normative naturalism. Certainly we could 
imagine other ways of grounding grounding facts. But (i) I’ve shown that non-naturalism 
is false on all those views currently thought plausible, and (ii) any new view might have 
problems of its own for the non-naturalist.87 More generally still, this concludes my defense 
of The Master Argument. Strictly speaking, the argument shows that Structure and non-
naturalism are incompatible. 
3.4 Defense of (4)  
 
The final option for the structured non-naturalist is to claim that principles are some 
kind of ungrounded fact. Call this the view that principles are fundamental facts. But I think 
                                                 
87 If, for example, we thought that the fact that A ‹ B was grounded in both A and B, then the structured 
non-naturalist would again be committed to denying irreflexivity.  
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this can’t be true: while there are some familiar problems with this view,88 my objection is 
that normative principles are just not the right sort of thing to be fundamental. Metaphysics 
has as at least one of its primary concerns figuring out which facts are fundamental. 
Metaphysicians not only want to know what there is—they want to know what’s at the 
bottom of it all, so to speak. The metaphysical grounding relation gives us an excellent way 
of going about this: the fundamental facts are the ungrounded ones.  
But we don’t want to know just which facts are fundamental, but also which objects 
and properties are fundamental. Theists would like to know if God is a fundamental object. 
Physicalists would like to know if mental properties are fundamental. Where grounding is 
a relation between facts, it’s not as straightforward how we would answer such questions. 
But I suggest the following principle: 
Fundamentality: An entity (e.g., fact, property, object, etc.) is fundamental if 
and only if it is a constituent of a fundamental fact.89 
 
This seems plausible to me: if mental properties are mentioned in the fundamental facts, 
then those physicalists who think mental properties aren’t fundamental will not be happy. 
If God is mentioned in the fundamental facts, then theists who think God is a fundamental 
object will feel vindicated.   
 Here’s an argument for Funtamentality: facts, we’ve said, are fundamental just 
when they’re ungrounded. But when are other entities fundamental? Assuming that there 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for the fundamentality of non-fact entities, I submit: 
                                                 
88 See McPherson (2012) for a Humean sort of worry that would apply here.  
89 See Litland (2017); Sider (2011): §7.2, 8.2.1; deRosset (2013): 3; Bennett (2011): 27. 
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such entities are fundamental just when we can’t describe the fundamental layer of reality 
without them. Suppose that facts about chairs are fully grounded in facts about sub-atomic 
particles: we can describe the fundamental layer of reality without ever mentioning chairs. 
Chairs are, in Michael Raven’s sense, eliminable in the grounding order.90 It’s natural to 
say, then, that chairs are not fundamental objects. Suppose, however, that facts about the 
sub-atomic particles that ground chairs are ungrounded—then we can’t describe the 
fundamental layer of reality without mentioning those particles. It is equally natural to then 
say that such particles are fundamental.  
 Consider, on the other hand, some alternative conditions on (non-fact) entity-
fundamentality. Why not think, for example, that fundamental facts need not have only 
fundamental entities as constituents, but rather: 
 Alternative 1: Fundamental facts have at least one fundamental entity as a 
constituent. 
Or, perhaps instead: 
 Alternative 2: An entity E is fundamental iff the fact that E exists is ungrounded. 
Alternative 1, however, is a non-starter: it is a necessary condition for fact-fundamentality, 
but gives neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on (non-fact) entity-fundamentality.  
 Alternative 2, on the other hand, has its own problems. Set aside that it has 
controversial consequences. (Material simples—plausibly fundamental—exist iff they are 
spatially located. But it might be that their being spatially located at least partially explains 
                                                 
90 Raven (2016). 
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their existence, rather than the other way around.) The main problem here is not that 
Alternative 2 is false—it’s that it entails Fundamentality, on two plausible assumptions. 
Consider the following argument from Alternative 2 to Fundamentality: 
1. An entity E is fundamental iff the fact that E exists is ungrounded. (Alternative 2) 
2. If the fact that E exists is ungrounded, then E is a constituent of an ungrounded fact. (First 
Plausible Assumption) 
3. If E is a constituent of an ungrounded fact, then the fact that E exists is ungrounded. 
(Second Plausible Assumption) 
4. Therefore, E is fundamental iff it is a constituent of a fundamental fact. 
(2) is plausible because E is a constituent of the fact that E exists. (3) is plausible since it 
seems counterintuive that there should be constituents of ungrounded facts whose existence 
is grounded. Consider a clear case in which an entity’s existence is grounded: material 
composites. The chair’s existence is grounded in the existence of its parts. Precisely 
because of this, it seems like chairs won’t show up in the fundamental layer of reality (the 
ungrounded facts).  
But now assume, as we must if we deny (2), that normative principles are 
fundamental. What are some candidate (fundamental) normative principles? Here are a 
few: 
 An act is wrong iff it doesn’t maximize happiness.  
 Belief that P is rational iff all the available evidence favors P over not-P. 
 The only thing good without qualification is the good will.  
 It is in one’s best interest to avoid painful experiences.  
 
If we assume that some principles are fundamental, surely at least one of these is a good 
candidate. But then the problem is clear: happiness and painfulness turn out to be 
fundamental properties, and beliefs and wills turn out to be fundamental objects. But that 
seems, at the very least, radically controversial.  
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 My argument doesn’t require the particular examples to be true fundamental 
principles. If premise (4) of the Master Argument is false, then there will be some true 
fundamental principle(s). And given what I said above—that the function of principles is 
to “take in” non-normative facts and “spit out” normative ones—such principles will have 
some non-normative object/property as a constituent. Now, it’s possible that that non-
normative entity will be fundamental—the fundamental normative principles could say 
something like “When the fundamental particles are arranged thus-and-so, then one ought 
to Φ”. But it would be outrageous to hold our normative metaphysics hostage to such 
principles. That’s just not what the fundamental normative principles look like, on any 
plausible normative theory.  
 Of course there are ways of replying to my argument here. One is to take issue with 
Fundamentality. “What this shows,” one might object, “is that Fundamentality is false—it 
commits us to the claim that principles can’t be fundamental. But this is more implausible 
than the denial of Fundamentality.” But this isn’t right. I have shown that Fundamentality 
is inconsistent with the view that normative principles are ungrounded facts. First, this may 
not apply to other kinds of principles: fundamental principles in physics may only have 
fundamental constituents. Second, Fundamentality is only a problem for the view that 
normative principles are fundamental on the assumption of Structure. Structure 
presupposes that principles are amongst the grounds of particular normative facts. Because 
grounding is factive, this entails that normative principles are facts. If such facts are 
ungrounded, Fundamentality gives rise to the problem I note. But if one thinks that 
principles are not amongst the grounds of other normative facts, but instead (as on Bader’s 
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view) stand outside the grounding relation and “govern” it, one is free to deny that 
principles are facts. And then, since Fundamentality only entails that an entity is 
fundamental when it is a constituent of a fundamental fact, one can endorse both 
Fundamentality and the view that principles are ungrounded. Fundamentality only causes 
problems for the proponent of Structure.   
A second type of reply is to accept Fundamentality, but to claim that normative 
principles are primitive—that they have no internal structure—as Maudlin claims of laws 
of nature.91 But this view of principles makes most sense on views that don’t place 
principles amongst the grounds of particular facts. I here treat grounding as a relation 
between facts, and facts have internal structure (so do truths and sentences, so my point 
here doesn’t depend on any controversial assumption about grounding). Since the 
structured non-naturalist assumes that principles are amongst the grounds of normative 
facts, she cannot appeal to a view like Maudlin’s.  
It also seems out of place for the structured non-naturalist to appeal to Shamik 
Dasgupta’s notion of autonomous facts. 92 An autonomous fact, according to Dasgupta, is 
one that is not apt for grounding. That a material simple is located at some particular place 
might be ungrounded—but it is still apt for grounding. The question “Why is the particle 
there?” isn’t out of place, even if there’s no answer to it. That it is essential to water that it 
is composed of H20 is also ungrounded, but it also seems like it would be out of place to 
ask for its grounds. The first fact is merely ungrounded; the second is autonomous.  
                                                 
91 See Maudlin (2007): 17-18. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this objection. 
92 Dasgupta (2014), Dasgupta (2016).  
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Yet even if we grant the distinction, it won’t help: autonomous facts are still 
fundamental, in my sense.93 So even if normative principles are autonomous, this doesn’t 
alleviate the problem with Fundamentality: principles will still be ungrounded facts, such 
that any entity that partially constitutes one is fundamental. We thus shouldn’t expect them 
to be made up of any non-fundamental entities. Yet normative principles involve 
apparently non-fundamental entities. Furthermore, plausible normative principles just 
aren’t good candidates for autonomous facts: it seems to make sense to ask why it is that 
an act is wrong iff it doesn’t maximize happiness, or why the good will is the only thing 
good without qualification. True, there may be no answer, just as there may be no answer 
as to why the material simple is located at a certain position. But as in all these cases, the 
questions seem to be in principle answerable.  
SECTION 4: OPTIONS FOR THE NON-NATURALIST 
 
I see two ways that the non-naturalist could avoid the problem I’ve outlined here 
while still retaining at least something like Structure. Since neither is without its problems, 
I will simply outline them here, noting the problems with each. The first solution is to deny 
Structure, replacing it with a closely related thesis.  Some philosophers—most notably 
Fine94—think that there is a distinct kind of grounding in the normative domain. Call it 
normative grounding, and let “A <N B” mean that A fully normatively grounds B, and “A 
                                                 
93 Dasgupta defines fundamentality differently, but this is irrelevant here. 
94 See Fine (2012a): 37-40. See also Rosen (MS).  
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‹N B” mean that A partially normatively grounds B. The main distinguishing mark of 
normative grounding is that when A <N B, A does not metaphysically entail B, but only 
normatively entails B; whereas, when A < B, A metaphysically entails B.95 When A 
normatively grounds B, A still explains B, but this is a normative, and not a metaphysical 
explanation. 
With this new notion in hand, the non-naturalist can endorse the following: 
StructureN: All substantive normative facts are partially normatively 
grounded in normative principles. 
 
StructureN will not be in conflict with non-naturalism, as Structure is. And yet it may save 
the intuitions behind Structure.  
 This solution has a problem. It’s a truism (or as close as philosophy can get to one) 
that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. But if normative facts are only fully 
normatively grounded in non-normative facts, then at best the non-naturalist can derive the 
following global supervenience claim: 
SupervenienceN: For any two normatively possible worlds W1 and W2, if W1 
and W2 are identical in all non-normative respects, then W1 
and W2 are identical in all normative respects. 
 
But the non-naturalist won’t be able to explain a stronger supervenience claim: 
SupervenienceM: For any two metaphysically possible worlds W1 and W2, if 
W1 and W2 are identical in all non-normative respects, then 
W1 and W2 are identical in all normative respects.96 
                                                 
95 Some question such entailment, such as Skiles (2015). I put such worries aside here, since without any 
such entailment, it becomes unclear how normative and metaphysical grounding are distinct, which would 
undermine the whole response here.  
96 See, e.g., McPherson (2012); Dreier (1992); Ridge (2007); Scanlon (2014): 3; Enoch (2011): ch. 6; 
Shafer-Landau (2003): 76-77. I don’t claim that all these authors endorse the specific formulation of 
supervenience given here, only that some form of supervenience across all metaphysically possible worlds 
is agreed on. 
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This is because, if A <N B, then B obtains in all the normatively possible worlds in which 
A obtains; but for all that, there may be a metaphysically possible world where A obtains 
but B doesn’t. (In fact, where A <N B, this seems to require that A not metaphysically entail 
B—that normative grounding involves a weaker entailment is part of how Fine defines the 
relation, and it is difficult to see how we would distinguish it from metaphysical grounding 
without this difference.97) The problem is, it is commonly thought that SupervenienceM is 
true, and for good reason: if it is false, then even though it is wrong for me to kick the cat, 
there could be a possible world where it is ok for me to do so, even though all the non-
normative features of the situation are the same. There could be worlds where the Rwandan 
genocide was permissible, though those worlds are just like this one in all non-normative 
respects.98 So there is a widely-accepted and deeply intuitive claim that the non-naturalist 
won’t be able to explain, if she resorts to normative grounding. (For all that, 
SupervenienceM may actually be false, but I cannot explore this response here.99) 
 A second solution is for the non-naturalist to appeal to what might be described as 
a variety of particularism. On this reply, principles play no robust explanatory role. There 
are just the substantive normative facts, where some of these may partially ground others 
(in the simplest case, conjunctive normative facts will be partially grounded in particular 
normative facts). That some normative facts partially ground others might be thought to 
save some of the spirit, if not the letter, of Structure. 
                                                 
97 Fine (2012a): section 1.  
98 See McPherson (2012), as well as Bader (forthcoming) for discussion. 
99 See Rosen (MS). 
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 This kind of particularism, when combined with non-naturalism, generates a 
problem. Even if some substantive normative facts ground others, if No Full is true (and 
there are no infinite chains or circles of ground), then some substantive normative facts 
will have to be ungrounded. Presumably these will be particular normative facts, such as 
that John’s motivation for cutting Linda off in the parking lot was bad. But such facts are 
horrible candidates for fundamentality—not only do they encounter similar problems with 
Fundamentality as normative principles did earlier—are motives fundamental entities?—
but they just seem like they must be at least partially grounded in non-normative facts. That 
John’s motivation was bad is partially grounded in the fact that he wanted to rile Linda up. 
But we can’t think both that (i) particular normative facts are always partially grounded by 
some non-normative fact, and (ii) some particular normative fact is ungrounded. So if the 




 Non-naturalists want to rule out the full metaphysical dependence of some 
substantive normative facts or principles on non-normative facts. Many of them also hold 
the view that there is some structure to the normative: that substantive normative facts are 
partially grounded in principles. I’ve tried to show here that these two commitments are 
incompatible. Of course, the non-naturalist could simply deny Structure. But it seems 
impossible to replace it with a look-alike principle without paying too high a cost.  
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